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BUREAUCRACY AROUND THE STATE: VARIETIES OF COLLECTIVE SELF-REGULATION IN
THE DUTCH DAIRY INDUSTRY.
1. Introduction.
Entrepreneurial action in capitalism - i.e. under conditions of competi­
tion and class conflict - is first of all guided, if not determined, by the 
imperatives of the different markets ( for final products, raw materials, 
capital and labour). During the course of development of capitalism new limi­
tations to free enterprise have been set by state regulations. In between these 
rules of the market and the state a third form can be distinguished: collective 
self-regulation by capitalists. In orde to compensate for shortcomings and 
self-destructive logics of the market, but to preempt state intervention, 
capitalists have banded together and agreed on mutual rules of conduct, limi­
ting their own individual autonomy in their collective long term interests. 
Whenever such forms of self-regulation involve the state to a greater or lesser 
extend, one can speak of corporatist arrangements, i.e. an interwovenness of 
the private and the public sphere. This may be the result of private assis­
tance in formulating and implementing public policy or state assistance in 
the formulation and implementation of private regulations.
Depending on the degree of state involvement in such arrangements and 
their genesis, Schmitter (1974) had distinguished two subtypes of corporatism, 
'state' and 'societal' corporatism. Schmitter uses these concepts to characteri 
whole societies, but they can also be used to characterize different arrange­
ments within one society, or even within one branch of industry. That implies 
that even'state corporatism', which Schmitter reserves for totalitarian 
states, could be found within one society, connected by him with 'societal 
corporatism': the liberal capitalist welfare state. As will be seen in this 
paper, such is indeed the case.
"State' and 'societal' corporatism are however still general types, which 
can best be seen as positions on a continuum of very little to very heavy 
state involvement in forms of capitalist self-regulation.
A first aim of this paper will be to distinguish a greater number of 
subtypes, which are empirically found on this continuum. For practical reasons 
I will restrict myself hereby to one particular industry in one particular 
country. Secondly, I will try to analyze some conditions for the emergence, 
success and stability of these different varieties of corporatism. Thirdly 
I will look into some consequences for the bureaucratic structure and func­
tioning of the state.
Schmitter pays primarily attention to the structural aspects of corpora­
tism. I will stress first of all the functional side. Different degrees of 




























































































tions, which may either be performed by the state or by the industry.
These subfunctions are:
1- The formulation of or giving advice on concepts of general rules;
2- The confimation of rules, de facto or formally;
3- The formulation of operationalizations and norms, necessary for the 
implementation of general rules;
4- The actual implementation and administration ;
5- The control on the observation of the rules;
6- The supervision of implementation and/or control;
7- The sanctioning of transgressors of the rules;
8- The handling of appeals.
Next attention will be directed to the structural side: what type of 
organizations do perform these functions and what is the state influence 
resp. the influence of the private industry on these organizations ? The 
following organizational characteristics will be distinguished:
1- Who are the initiators ? What is the development pattern of emergence ?
2- Legal recognition. Is the organization structure regulated in formal law ? 
2a-Less extreme: Is state permission required for changes in the organizatio­
nal structure ?
3~ Autonomy of authority. Do decisions need state approval ?
4- Influence of the state on the governing board.
5- Do organizations receive state subsidy ?
6- Statutory or de facto monopoly within the domain of the organization.
7- Statutory or de facto compulsory membership.
8- Statutory or de facto 'tax authority'.
9- Statutory or private sanctions (Public law, disciplinary law, civil code)
10- Do organizations issue state (guaranteed) licenses ?
11- Influence of firms on the executive board (direct, indirect and no represen­
tation) .
On the basis of these variables, the influence of the state and/or private 
industry on the staff - i.e. the autonomy of the organization vis a vis 
industry and state - can also be measured.
Both categories, functional and structural characteristics, will be 
used to place different forms of self-regulation on a continuuum between 
maximum private and maximum state influence and to indicate whether the 
arrangement was created 'bottom up' by the private industry or 'top down' 
by the state. In addition, something will be said about why, and under 
what conditions these different forms have emerged; whether they are sucees- 
ful in carrying out their tasks, in unburdening the state and in the mobili­
zation of legitimacy ; whether they are stable ; and how differences in success 




























































































2. Motivation of sector-selection.
The greatest variety in forms of corporatist self-regulation can be found 
by comparing as many different policy areas as possible. Obviously, this cannot 
be done for the whole economy, at least in the Netherlands, where a bewildering 
proliferation of such arrangements can be found. Therefore, an industrial 
sector had to be selected. The choice has been the dairy industry, because it 
probably has the largest variety of forms of self-regulation, which, in addi­
tion, have often a long history and hence have shown considerable stability, 
even though the organizational characteristics may have changed over time.
The sector has first of all the different forms of corporatism, which can be 
found also elsewhere in the Dutch economy, such as the statutory trade asso­
ciations or the social security sector assoc. Investigation of the dairy industry 
hence presents us first of all with a cross-section of corporatist arrangements, 
found generally in the Dutch economy. In addition, the dairy industry has 
some corporatist arrangements, peculiar to the industry. The reasons for this 
great variety will become clear in the course of this paper. It is one of its 
aims to delineate such reasons.
A final - practical - reason for the choice of the dairy industry is 
that this paper is an outcome of an international comparative study on the 
organization of business interests. One of the sectors selected for this study 
- in international consultation - is the dairy industry.
3. A short characterization of the Dutch dairy industry.
The dairy industry is quite an important industry in the Netherlands 
and'was that even more so in the past. The importance stems not so much from its 
contribution to the GNP -the dairy sector accounts for about 6 % of all indus­
trial sales - as well as from its connection with the still important agricul­
tural sector. The Dutch economy has until after the second world war been an 
agrarian economy, supplying the surrounding industrialized nations as Germany 
and England with food. Even now, the food processing industry as a whole is one 
of the largest sectors of the economy. Within this food processing sector, the 
dairy industry is the largest branch, which is not surprising , given the fact 
that two-thirds of all farming land is used for dairy cattle farming. Even 
though only 22.000 people are employed directly by the dairy industry, indi­
rectly over 200.000 people depend on it: as dairy fanners, in the industry, 
in the dairy trade and in the many associations and organizations of the indus­
try.
International trade is very important. Not counting consumption milk 
(which is primarily sold on the domestic market), 83,5 % of all products are 




























































































is the largest exporter of condensed milk, milk powder and cheese in the 
world and only second to New Zealand in the butter-branch. As a result, the 
sector is sensitive to international competition, but its position in this 
competition is relatively unthreatened, due to low production costs of the 
raw material - Dutch cows have by far the highest annual milk gift in the 
world - and large, modern factories.
The sector has known a strong merger movement. Around 1900 - when indus­
trial dairy production originated owing to a number of technical innovations - 
there were over 900 firms. By 1980 this was reduced to 62. Among these 62 
there are 4 very large firms - each located in a different part of the country - 
which account together for 2/3 of the national production. Competition used 
to be fierce in the past, but is now reduced due to EC-intervention, the oli­
gopolistic market structure and the existence of several cartels (see further 
down).
Homogeneity is of course relatively high, due to the limited number of 
products and the bulk character of the production process. There are also 
no (more) large differences between firms in labour productivity, in growth- 
rate and in profitability. Only in firm size are there significant differen­
ces. An important distinction in the industry is however that between coopera­
tives owned by farmers and private capitalist firms. Were their respective 
shares in production around 1910 about equal, the influence of the cooperatives 
has since then grown steadily. By now, cooperatives account for 90 % of all 
production. Ther 4 large firms are all cooperatives. The private sector is 
primarily active in the branches of consumption milk and condensed milk.
Large multinational firms in condensed milk, such as Nestle and Carnation, 
dominate whatever there is left of the private capitalist sector. Structural 
differences and hence differences in interests between these two types of 
firms have however become very small. The very large cooperatives function more 
and more just like any other capitalist enterprise. Competition and class 
conflict are also for them the conditions of existence.
4. Overview of regulations and organizations by policy areas.
In the course of the development of the dairy industry many binding regu­
lations have been agreed to by the industry and/or have been imposed by the 
state. These can be ordered in four rough categories: 1) products and sales 
market;2)raw materials;3) labour; and 4) organization and technology.
A- Ordering of the product market and sales promotion have been concerns of
the voluntary business associations from the very start. Collective sales, sales 
promotion and combatment of adulteration of products were the original goals 
for which such associations were established in between 1890 and 1906. Gradually 




























































































by the voluntary interest associations, sometimes in cooperation with the 
state. State influence increased especially during and after world war I and 
during the economic crisis of the thirties. At the moment the following groups 
of binding regulations can be distinguished: 
a- re market ordering:
1- Sales and prices, especially on the foreign markets, are regulated by the 
EC-dairy policy, in the Netherlands implemented by a Statutory Trade Associa­
tion for the Dairy Industry in so called 'co-government' with the national 
and EC-authorities.
2- In addition to these there are some 'autonomous regulations' by this statu­
tory trade association. Before the coming about of the EC-dairy policy, in 1964, 
there were many more of such 'autonomous' regulations. They were similar to
the present EC levies, interventions and subsidies.
3- Private cartels , regulations on prices, production quota and sales condi­
tions exist for some products not directly regulated by the EC, such as 
condensed milk, coffee cream, consumption milk and cheese.
4- For some products (consumption milk, coffee cream, molten cheese) there 
are binding regulations concerning packaging and labelling.
5- In one region, the dairy province Friesland, investments of firms are regu­
lated by the voluntary regional dairy business association.
b- re collective sales promotion:
6- There are regulations compelling all firms to contribute to collective 
promotion of dairy products. These funds are levied by the earlier mentioned 
statutory trade association and given to two special institutions, the 
Dutch Dairy Bureau and the Holland Cheese Exporters Association.
c- re product quality:
The product market is further ordered by regulation of product quality. In 
the past this was done on a voluntary basis by business associations. Now, this 
area has become largely the concern of general state regulations framing the 
acitivities of private control institutions. Three degrees of quality regula­
tion can be distinguished:
7- Minimum standards for milk and dairy products sold on the domestic market, 
laid down in the Food and Drugs Act (Warenwet). They are implemented and 
controlled by state agencies.
8- Composition of products above minimum standards and classification (e.g.
on the basis of milk fat content) of butter, cheese, milkpowder and condensed 
milk is regulated in special state decrees, intended to promote exports.
These regulations are operationalized,implemented and controlled by a number 
of private quality control boards.
9- Product 'quality' in the narrower sense of the word, that is taste,smell 




























































































ted by private organizations.
B- Ordering of the raw materials supply also has a long history. In the
past, there has been very heavy competition between factories for fanners. This 
has lead to heavy price undercutting and paying too much for bad quality milk, 
with the resulting threat of further deterioration of milk quality and conse­
quently of product quality, reputation and (export)sales. The following 
regulations have emerged: 
a- re quantity of milk:
10- Compulsory supply of all milk, not needed on the farm, to factories.
This is an 'autonomous' decree of the statutory trade association.
11- In order to reduce competition between factories over farmers-suppliers, 
some regional associations of dairy firms have bindingly determined which 
farmer should supply which factory. In cases of conflict over the boundaries 
of 'supply territories', the regional associations provide binding arbitra­
tion.
b- re the price of raw milk:
12- The raw materials market has further been ordered by binding rules on the
price of raw milk. Cooperatives pay a weekly advance on the milkprice. At 
the end of the year, the final price the farmer gets, is determined. This 
is done in order to calculate the profits of the cooperatives away in the 
price of raw materials. The owner-farmers get their 'dividends' in this
way for tax purposes. In the past, factories used to compete continually, 
luring farmers away fromone another by a higher advance on the milkprice.
In some areas of the country, the regional dairy associations have made 
binding rules regulating the calculation of the advance on the milk price 
and in one case (Friesland) even determine the advance centrally every 
fortnight. Competition is so reduced to the annual final payment. 
c- re quality of raw milk:
13- The milk price is based on the hygiene of raw milk and the fat- and 
protein content. Therefore, binding norms for hygiene - including minimum 
standards - have been set, as wallas regulations concerning the procedures 
and techniques of measurement. These norms are set, implemented and controlled 
by special private boards.
14- Similarly, norms have been set for fat- and protein content measurement. 
Implementation and control has been the work of the voluntary business 
associations.
C- The regulations concerning labour are - contrary to those just mentioned -
not specific for the dairy industry. There are three labour related matters 
regulated in general industry-wide acts, but implemented by private sector 




























































































15- Wages and other labour conditions. These are annually negotiated, imple­
mented and supervised by the private employers' associations and trade 
unions, but within the context of legislation on wage determination.
16- Social Security is regulated in a number of general acts, which make parti­
cipation obligatory - except for the Sickness Absence Act. A number of these 
plans, the unemployment act, the sickness absence act and the disablement 
act are implemented by bipartite sector boards, among them a board for the 
dairy industry, the "Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Zuivelindustrie".
17- The introduction of works councils and their structure and authority are 
regulated in a general act on works councils. Supervision on its implemen­
tation and binding arbitration in conflicts between individual employers 
and workers is delegated to bipartite sector boards. The "Bedrijfscommis- 
sie voor de Zuivelindustrie" performs these tasks for the dairy industry.
D- Finally, there are collective regulations concerning organization and
technology. These are:
18- Collective dairy research with compulsory financial participation. Just 
as with collective propaganda, (no.6) levies are imposed by the statutory 
trade association and handed over to a separate institution, the NIZO or 
Dutch Institute for Dairy Research.
19- In some regions of the country, the regional dairy associations control 
the books of the member firms and stipulate bookkeeping procedures and 
techniques to be used. The associations did and do this on behalf of the 
farmer-owners of the cooperatives, who did especially in the past not feel 
knowledgeable enough to control the management of their factory. The insti­
tution of this tradition was stimulated by the suspicion which existed 
between farmers and factory directors.
20- Finally, firms are subject to pollution control measures and pollution 
taxation , in the implementation of which the private business associations 
participate. Some regional dairy associations measure the pollution emissions 
of their member-factories, on the basis of which the state imposes a levy.
These regulations and organisations differ very much in the degree of 
self regulation or , in complementary terms, state involvement. They can also 
be ordered along a continuum of state interference. This will be done shortly. 
First however I will outline the existing system of voluntary interest associa­
tions, which sometimes perform self-regulatory functions, but more often have 





























































































5. The voluntary interest associations of the dairy industry.
There are at present 12 voluntary business associations in the Dutch dairy 
industry left. They can be found in the bottom line - the first order associa­
tions - of the accompanying organization chart. Three categories can be distin­
guished: a) general associations of cooperative firms; b) general associations 
of the private industry; and c) product-specific associations.
The cooperative sector is organized in 4 regional and one national dairy 
association. In the past, there have been 8 regional associations, whose domain 
boundaries coincided mostly with provincial boundaries. Four of these have been 
liquidated in the mean time. Due to the merger movement they had only one very 
large member left. The remaining 4 regional associations form together with 
the remaining individual large firms in other parts of the country the national 
cooperative dairy union FNZ , which has become the most influential voluntary 
association in the sector. Of all the regional associations (the Frisian dairy 
union ,in the'dairy province' Friesland, is the most important one, among others 
owing to the fact that the merger movement has not gone so far yet there. The union 
does hence not yet get competition from a large member.
The small private industry is organized in one association, the W Z M  
(Association for Dairy Industry and Milk Hygiene), with much less resources, as 
may be indicated by its number of staff: 6. By comparison, the FNZ has 95 
staff members and the Frisian Union over 200.
Furthermore, there are 6 smaller product-specific associations: for condensed 
milk, coffee cream, butter concentrate, consumption milk, molten cheese and 
ice cream. Their members are usually also associated to the general dairy 
associations.
There is not really a sector peak association in the dairy indus­
try. Formally, there exists a 'Central Dairy Committee', to which the FNZ and 
the W Z M  are affiliated, but this committee has only met trice in the past 15 
years. Real interest aggregation and coordination takes place in the non-volun­
tary statutory trade association for the dairy industry. Most associations are 
present on the executive council or in subcommittees of this statutory associa­
tion.
The FNZ and the W Z M  are, as general associations, the ones which represent 
the industry in most specialized sector boards. They are also the only employers' 
associations, and hence carry out the wage negotiations. All the product-speci­
fic associations are purely trade associations. Some are disguised cartels and 
hence organizations of self-regulation.
To complete the picture: on the labour side the situation is more simple.
There is no sector specific labour union any more. Workers in the dairy indus­
try can become a member of three competing unions: the largest 'Voedingsbond 






















































































































































































sing industry), the smaller protestant 'Voedingsbond CNV' or the 'Unie BLHP', 
a general union of medium and higher employees.
The unions are present on the executive councils of some of the earlier 
mentioned sector boards: They are represented in all social sector boards 
and in the statutory trade association (although the largest union has left 
its seats vacant over the past 5 years for ideological reasons). The other 
boards, for quality control, raw materials, collective propaganda, research, 
etc. are solely activities of the business associations.
6. Self-regulation and variations in state-intervention.
In the following paragraphs the different types of regulation and the 
concommittant organizations will be discussed in more detail. The following 
topics will be covered: a) the present distribution of responsibility between 
the state and the private industry for the different subfunctions; b) the orga­
nizational structure and its degree of autonomy vis a vis the state as well as 
vis a vis the firms; c) the historical conditions of emergence (in the nature 
of the industrial structure and/or state policy); d) and the succes and stabi­
lity of the arrangement and the conditions which might explain it.
The different types of regulation will be treated in the order of increa­
sing state involvement. Some of the afore-mentioned regulations have been lumped 
together because they are functionally and structurally similar, i.e. they are 
performed in a similar way by one and the same organization or by similar 
organizations. In this way the 20 different regulations are reduced to 12 varia­
tions. Their functional and structural characteristics are summarized in table I.
6.1.Self-regulation within business interest associations:The Frisian Dairy 
Union.
The purest form of collective private self-regulation is found within 
some regional cooperative dairy associations. These have agreed on rules binding 
to their members, but as the density ratio in their respective domains is near 
100 %, they in fact regulate the industry in their domain. The strongest case 
is that of the Frisian dairy union, which is and has always been the most 
tightly knit organization in the dairy industry ( and possibly even in the 
whole Dutch industry). That is to say, it has the largest number of binding 
rules of all dairy unions and actively controls and sanctions them.
These rules determine the milk supply territories of the different firms, 
determine the advance on the milk price paid to farmers,prescribe bookkeeping 
techniques and the control of the books of the firms by the association and 
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one association maintaining the regulations no.11,12,16 and 4, mentioned ear­
lier in par.4.
All subfunctions around the four types of regulation are performed by one 
and the same private association: the formulation and determination of rules as 
well as operationalizations, the actual administration, control, sanctioning 
and the handling of the appeals procedures. At no stage is there government 
interference, except of course in so far as the state registers constitutions 
of private associations, requires them to satisfy the civil code and backs 
internal association rules by private contract law. The rules of the Frisian 
union regarding milk supply territories and border conflicts, the advance on 
the milk price and the financial control of the firms are all laid down in 
the constitution of the association . Regulation of investment behavior however 
is done more informally by the association's staff, on the basis of its acquired 
authority over members.
Except again for the formal recognition by the inclusion in the public 
association register, there is no state influence on or within the Frisian 
dairy association. Decisions do not need state approval, there is no state 
representative on the board, the association does not receive state subsidies 
and carries out the sanctions itself (except for the backing in the end by 
contract law). Furthermore, there is no state assistance for authority of the 
association over its members. The Frisian union has no statutory privileges.
Nevertheless, it has acquired quite some autonomy vis a vis its members.
To be sure, since the union is an association with members, the members are 
renresented <~>n the executive board - as required by the civil code. Further­
more membership is formally voluntary. De facto it has however become obli­
gatory. No firm in the province can permit itself not to be a member. More­
over, there is no alternative organisation. The Frisian union has always had 
a monopoly in its domain, even without state assistance. More importantly, 
the degree of professionalization has become very high. The association has 
a staff of over 200 employees ( on an industry, employing only 1.600 workers ). 
The de facto influence of the secretary has been very high (although this 
is changing under the growth in size of the member firms). An indication for this 
is that the secretary in the past had an important say in the selection of 
directors for the member firms, formally the task of the executive committee 
of the cooperatives, made up by member-farmers of the cooperative. "When a 
dairy engineer had carrier aspirations, he did best to request an audience 
with the union secretary", thus our informant. The secretary could develop 
such a position because of the lack of expertise among the farmer-members of 
the cooperatives, in combination with a distrust among farmers vis a vis the 
director of their dairy facotory, as well as the great financial interest of 



























































































for all eventual financial losses, according to the legislation on coopera­
tives. The secretary owed its authority hence to the need by the boards of the 
cooperatives for a neutral outside advisor. Furthermore, the authority is based 
on a dependence, which has been the result of the many services the secretariat 
of the Frisian union provides to the affiliated cooperatives. Over the years, 
the members have become used to this dependency-relation. A consensus has 
developed over the need for a strong, well resourced organization with autho­
rity over the members, in their mutual interest. In this way, the association 
developed into a kind of executive of a multi-plant firm, providing staff 
services and exercising authority over the affiliated plants. The difference 
with a business firm is however that the member-firms are autonomous. They 
can formally withdraw from the association. In addition, the relationship is 
not only a hierarchical one. The staff autonomy is important when it comes to 
implementation and control. The association policy however is - contrary to in 
business firms - determined by the members. The binding rules are the result 
of sometimes extended negotiations between the members in the policy-making 
councils. The bookkeeping prescriptions as well as the advance on the milk- 
price - determined every fortnight - are prepared in special member-committees, 
and finally determined by the executive board. The rules on the milk supply 
territories are fixed regulations. 'Border conflicts' are resolved by binding 
arbitration by a committee of 'distinguished persons', which acts autonomous 
from the executive, and also decides on appeals by members to association 
decisions and sanctions.
The existence of these forms of self-regulation can only be explained by 
the past. Both need and possibility stem from the structure of the industry 
in former days. The need for such regulations developed out of two factors: 
a) the fierce competition between factories for farmer-milk suppliers; 
and b) the distrust between farmer-members of the cooperatives and factory 
directors.
The fierce competition resulted from the existence in the early days 
of many small factories (1908: 84 in Friesland, compared to the present 11), 
the easy entry to the market due to the still low degree of capital intensity 
and the need for more milk suppliers. The cooperatives were interested in paying 
their members as high a milkprice as possible. In order to maximize this 
price, they had to increase efficiency, among others by using economies of 
scale. This required more milk suppliers . The farmer-owners of a cooperative 
were so interested in increasing their number by luring farmers away from 
neighboring cooperatives, among others by offering a (temporary)higher milk 
price. A first attempt to reduce this type of competition was the measure 
to centrally prescribe the advance on the milk price, introduced in the 




























































































and competition was restricted to the annual final payment of the milk price. 
Competition was more drastically reduced by the binding prescription to each 
farmer which factory he should supply. As this was an important encroachment 
on the freedom of the farmer, it was not easily agreed upon. It took over 30 
years of discussion, and of all regional dairy unions only the Frisian succeeded 
in establishing binding arbitration of 'border conflicts'.
The distrust of farmers vis a vis their director and their interest in the 
financial management of their firms, given their personal liability, has been 
mentioaed already. This was an important motive for the association becoming 
the 'accountant' of the factories on behalf of the farmers. The same opposition 
between farmers and directors also lead to a control of the association on the 
determination of the quality and the fat- and protein content of the milk by 
the factory. Quality and composition of the milk formed namely the basis of the 
milk prices, the farmer got from the factory. In later years quality control 
became the subject of a special control arrangement. Therefore it will be dis­
cussed later on (Cf.par,6.4.)
Self-regulation was a response to a need, but required also preconditions, 
making self-regulation possible . A most important condition was the emergence of 
a rather autonomous organization with a secretariat with a high degree of autho­
rity. As has been indicated, this was the result again of the farmer-director 
opposition, of the lack of knowledge among farmers and of the need for central 
services. In addition, a strong social identity between the members has enhanced 
the possibility of self-regulation.
This social identity stems first of all from the common property structure 
and the ties of the cooperatives to the agricultural world and its organizations. 
Secondly, the existence of 'common enemies' in the form of capitalist dairy 
firms and dairy traders/customers, who opposed the establishment of cooperatives 
in the early days and later on their market ordering regulations, provided 
a common fate. Thirdly, the exceptional strong organization in Friesland has 
to be explained from a common regional identity. Friesland, as a rural and 
agricultural province, has always had many conflicts of interest with other, 
especially the western part of the country , where political power is concen- 
ttrated and interests in international trade and finance dominated politics.
The Frisians,in addition, have their own specific culture, even their own 
language, distinct from Dutch, which has all contributed to strong social 
cohesion among the Frisian dairy cooperatives.
The arrangements have been quite succesful. Competition has been reduced, 
broad consensus over self-regulation has further enhanced the legitimacy of the 
interest association and strengthened social cohesion. State intervention has 
not been necessary to alleviate the problems to which the private regulations 




























































































likely be continued, if it was not for the fact that they might become redun­
dant in the future. The merger movement - which by the way has also reduced 
competition for farmers - is likely to continue. Whenever the 11 remaining 
dairy firms one day form a single cooperative, a single association of 
dairy farmers exploiting a number of factories, as has already happened in 
other parts of the country, the interfirm self-regulation will automatically 
be replaced by intra-firm rules. Horizontal agreement will then cease to be 
the basis for the rules and will be replaced by hierarchic authority.
In such a case, the territorial scope of the regulations could be changed: 
from provincial they might become national rules. But this is not likely.
With the increasing size of firms, the authority relations between associations 
and their member-firms are changing, also on the national level. The large 
firms will no longer feel the need to have their books controlled by an asso­
ciation. If only for the fact that the influence of the farmers in their 
cooperatives is decreasing with the increase in size, and professionalization 
of the dairy cooperatives. More and more cooperatives function just like any 
other capitalist enterprise. Moreover, the financial stake of the farmers in 
the cooperatives is presently being reduced. Were they in the past fully liable 
for all debts , full liability has now been limited. Full liability was necessary 
in the past to be able to loan the necessary capital, which the farmers did 
not have themselves.(Choice of the cooperative legal form was not so much 
ideologically as well as financially motivated). By now, the cooperatives 
have amassed such huge amounts of capital that they have no problem any more 
with the financing of their investments.
As far as the supply and price of the raw material milk is concerned, 
there is presently already an informal understanding on these matters between 
the four large cooperatives. It won't be likely that they will feel a need 
to formalize such agreements. Formal binding rules, backed up by sanctions, seem 
especially necessary when the number of concerned firms is reasonably large.
With only a limited number of competitors prisoners dilemma problems, which 
might jeopardize agreements, are much less likely to occur. The end of this 
type of self-regulation hence seems to be near, notwithstanding its remarkable 
stability over the past years.
6.2. Cartels (on the product market).
Cartels are a special type of self-regulation by voluntary business 
associations and are hence also private arrangements. The afore mentioned 
regulations of business associations are in fact nothing more than cartels on the 
raw materials market, just as collective wage agreements have been cartels 
on the labour market, at least in those prewar years when these agreements 




























































































reserved for self-regulation on the product-market.
Such cartels differ from the 'cartels on the raw materials market' 
in sofar as they have been the object of state intervention. Cartels on the 
product market are in most countries normally seen as contrary to the public 
interest and legal interference has usually gone in the direction of limitation 
or outright prohibition. This is the case in such 'liberal'countries as the 
USA (anti-trust legislation) and in countries, where legislation has been 
strongly influenced by the USA, such as Western Germany. The Dutch government 
has had a more lenient attitude towards cartels, at least until the very recent 
adjustments to the EC-cartel legislation. In the Netherlands, cartels have 
been legally allowed , unless...In other countries legislation approaches 
cartels from the opposite way: they are prohibited, unless... Cartels in the 
Netherlands have to be registered with the government ( in a secret cartel 
register). By thus informing the state, the latter may decide to declare the 
private arrangement illegal-. On the other hand, the state may also declare 
the cartel generally binding for all firms in the industrial sector concerned, 
including those, not present around the table when the agreement was reached, 
that is, if asked to do so. The state will take such a measure, whenever it 
is convinced that this serves a general interest or is necessary to protect the 
industry. Such generally binding cartels exist for example in the sector of 
book publishing (seen as a prerequisite for the availability of a wide variety 
of Dutch books), or in several retail trades to protect small shopkeepers 
from competition by large supermarkets. Private business has hence the possi­
bility of state assistance to prevent free ridership jeopardizing a private 
agreement. This dates from the 1935 Act on Generally Binding Declaration of 
Cartels, instituted during the economic crisis to enable the state to protect 
industries against self-destruction.
There are a number of cartel-agreements in the dairy industry, varying 
in degree of formality. Only one, in consumption milk, is declared generally 
binding, but as this is a regulation of the statutory trade association for 
the dairy industry, it will be discussed later on (par.6.6.). In the other 
cartels the only state involvement is that they have to be registered with 
the state. (In so far they differ from the regulations, mentioned in par.6.1.). 
Everything else is a private affair.
The most formalized cartel is the one on coffee cream for the domestic 
market ('evap'). This cartel has the disguise of a product-specific interest 
association, the Association of Dutch Coffee Cream Manufacturers. It is a 
quota cartel. The 5 members get every year a part of the market, dependent on 
their historic market share (the average over the past 3 years).If they sell 
more than their quotum, they have to pay a significant fine to the association. 
Out of the funds, created by these fines, the secretariat of the association 




























































































less than their quotum receive a compensation. This cartel is restricted to 
coffee cream sold in bottles. Unsweetened condensed milk (that is what coffee 
cream is), sold in tins, is not part of the arrangement, but its market share 
in the Netherlands is very small. Its producers, such as Nestle and Carnation, 
do not belong to the club.
The agreement is a relatively recent one - it dates from 1973 - and was a 
reaction to a market squeeze, a threatening overcapacity. It was sponsored by 
an already existing Association of Manufacturers of Condensed Milk (from 1953) 
The majority of participants knew each other already from this association.
The agreement is relatively unstable, as most voluntary cartels seem to 
be. Presently, the cartel is undermined by member-firms selling more and more 
coffee cream in paper packaging, which does not (yet) fall under the quota 
system.
One would expect a cartel especially on the domestic market, because 
agreements for a limited territory might be more easy to implement and control 
Nevertheless, there are also two cartels for the international market, negotia 
ted in the Netherlands. They have a more informal character. Their effectivity 
stems from the high share of Dutch exports in the international trade.
One such cartel concerns condensed milk, where Dutch producers have a 
60 % share in world trade. Furthermore, the remaining AO % is primarily 
accounted for by two large multinational firms, Nestle and Carnation, which, 
through their Dutch subsidiaries, are present around the table. This table 
is set within the aforementioned Association of Manufacturers of Condensed 
Milk, and has informally grown over the years. It seems to be more stable than 
the coffee cream agreement. This by the way may be an explanation for the 
fact that here less formal arrangements were sufficient. Another explanation 
for this informality may however be that the foreign participants might get 
in trouble in their home country, when their cartel-activities became te much 
in public focus.
A third price agreement concerns exported cheese (where the Dutch take 
care of 25 % of world trade). Here the institutional cover is provided by the 
national cooperative dairy union FNZ, as 93 % of the cheese production is in 
cooperative hands. The cheese manufacturers meet every fortnight in the Cheese 
Committee of the association, to discuss prices and set minimum export prices. 
The agreement is relatively unstable. The present overcapacity and the resul­
ting fierce competition lead regularly to a désintégration of the arrangement. 
All the more because - given the informal character - there are no sanctions 
placed on the agreement. But every time again the producers have succeeded in 
coming up with a new temporary agreement.
For other products, such as butter and milkpowder, there are no private 




























































































their absence in butter and milkpowder can be explained by several factors.
A very important reason for this difference is that the markets for butter and
milkpowder are under the direct influence of the EC-collective dairy policy 
and the other products not. Butter and milkpowder are namely the so-called 
intervention products. Surplus raw milk can, processed in butter and milkpowder, 
be handed in at the EC-intervention bureaus against a minimum price, set by 
the EC-authorities, the so-called intervention price. However, firms as well as 
farmers prefer of course to make a better price than this minimum for their 
processed raw milk. They are especially keen on selling milk processed into 
cheese, because this product has the highest value added, and therefore could 
yield the highest proceeds. Henceforth competition is the fiercest on the 
cheese market. The need for price agreements is therefore here the highest.The
strong competition makes it at the same time relatively difficult. The result
is an unstable and informal price arrangement, which continually needs to be 
renewed.
The presence of cartels in the branches of coffee cream and condensed 
milk must be explained differently. Here not so much need as well as opportunity 
is the deciding factor. Coffee cream is produced by only 5 firms for a stable, 
relatively closed domestic market. Condensed milk on the international market 
is also produced by a limited number of large firms, all present in the Nether­
lands, with a lenient cartel-policy. What more could big dairy business wish ?
6.3.Collective Wage Agreements.
Collective wage agreements are more'public' in sofar as they are not 
any more an internal arrangement of business, as the types of regulation 
mentioned so far, but are the result of negotiations between two or more 
organizations, representing different social classes.
In the Netherlands they can even be more'public'. Just as the state has 
the authority to declare cartels generally binding, it can also do that with 
sector-wide collective wage agreements, negotiated by voluntary associations.
In fact, the 1937 Act on the Generally Binding Declaration of Collective Wage 
Agreements was modelled on the cartel act from two years earlier. By doing so, 
the agreement gets a public law character and becomes binding also for those 
employers and employees, not represented by the negotiating partners. Here 
again, the associations get state support in preventing free riderproblems 
jeopardizing the arrangement. {.competitors paying lower wages and hence
being able to sell at lower prices.) Such state support also strenthens the 
negotiating organizations. Membership becomes namely more attractive. If 
firms want to have a say on the wages they are going to have to pay, the only 




























































































a collective agreement is declared generally binding - on request of the 
partners in the agreement - the state becomes involved in confirmation, 
control of observation and sanctioning of the regulations. This is the case 
in many branches of industry.
The sector-wide collective wage agreement in the dairy industry is however 
usually not declared generally binding. The employers at least feel no need 
for it. They bind their members by signing the contract, and as almost al firms 
are organized, the agreement is in fact binding for the whole industry, only 
on grounds of civil law (Only two small dairy cooperatives are unorganized, one 
for personal reasons, another for ideological ones. It is located in an 
extremely orthodox protestant region). The difference is that confirmation, 
implementation, control on observation and sanctioning is all done by private 
employers associations, with the assistance of trade unions and private contract 
law.
This is an indication of the preference of the dairy industry - as well 
as its capacity, in this case based on the high density ratio - for private 
self-regulation. Whenever possible, the dairy industry has tried to minimize 
state intervention - as will be seen in paragraphs yet to follow. The only 
state involvement in the actual process of collective agreements is passive: 
just as cartels, the collective wage agreements are registered with the 
state. State influence on the organizational structure is also minimal. As 
far as the employers' side is concerned, the same type of voluntary business 
associations as involved in the regulations mentioned in the previous para­
graphs, negotiate and implement the agreements. They have no statutory powers, 
are not formally recognized by the state, receive no state subsidies, etc.
The initiators however have not been private business. The first collec­
tive wage agreement came about under pressure of the trade unions and the 
state. The dairy associations have long withstood such pressures, at least on 
the national level. The Frisian dairy union agreed already in 1905 to a 
province-wide wage agreement, if only with a trade union, sponsored if not 
established by itself. This agreement moreover was voluntary. Member-firms 
could pay the wages and working hours, mentioned in the agreement, but were 
not obliged to do so. Only after 1920 did the signature of the association 
president came to bind the members. In other regions, as well as nationally, uni­
lateral voluntary agreements on wages and working conditions were made among 
employers. Such 'cartels on the labour market' became however never binding.
The first nation-wide bilateral sector agreement came much later, in 
1948, many decades too after national wage agreements had been reached in 
other industries. In 1948, the dairy associations could no longer withstand 
the external pressures. The postwar state-guided wage policy and the national, 




























































































industry-wide consultation body, established at the end of world war II in the 
illegality) forced all sectors, which did not yet have a collective wage 
agreement, to settle on one. (Only then did the dairy business associations 
join a national peak employers' association, namely for advice on the collec­
tive wage negotiations). The emergence of this type of bilateral self-regula­
tion was hence the result of national developments in labour relations and of 
the general increase in state intervention by the new, partly social-democratic 
governments under the conditions of postwar scarcity.
So far, the formal procedures around wage negotiations have been sketched. 
The last 10-15 years however have seen a continuation of abnormality. Almost 
every year parliament has accepted temporary ad hoc enabling bills, authorizing 
the state to intervene in wage negotiations. Thus the state has set ever more 
restricting conditions to the wage negotations , setting e.g. limits to 
compensation for inflation, vacation pay, minimum wages, etc. As a result, the 
private character of wage negotiations has become more and more only a formal 
matter. The material content of the agreements has been state-determined. The
autonomy of private business has thus been very unstable here, due to the 
periodic but increasing state intervention nationally. This is a more general 
tendency, as will be seen in following paragraphs.
6.A. Quality Control of Raw Materials.
Milk, as an organic matter, is a sensitive raw material. It deteriorates 
fast and is easily polluted. This is not only a danger to public health, but 
also to the efficiency of the production process. Milk, polluted for example 
with butter-acid bacteria creates problems in the cheese manufacture and re­
sults in a higher percentage of waste material or second class products. In 
order to stimulate farmers to produce good quality milk, factories voluntarily 
introduced already at an early date the principle of payment according to 
quality. In 1933 the state made this compulsory in the western urbanized 
part of the country, where most milk was used as consumption milk. In 1958 this 
obligation was extended to the whole country. This was an initiative of the 
state, who however delegated the necessary rule-making to the statutory 
trade association (Cf.par.6.7.)
In addition to the 'quality' (the cleanliness, presence of bacteria, 
anti-biotics-residues,etc.) also the fat- and protein content of the milk is 
important, because it determines the 'dairy-value' to be derived out of the 
milk. A higher fat-percentage leads to more butter per unit milk. A higher 
protein content makes for better quality cheese. Hence, next to payment 
according to 'quality' also payment on the basis of 'quantity' - as it was 
called - came gradually to be an accepted practice. In the fifties this also 




























































































This payment-system lead to a need for an 'objective'determination of the 
milk quality. Factories could of course determine quantity and quality in 
their own laboratories. But first of all, the farmers did not trust their fac­
tories enough to allow them to determine quantity and quality without any form 
of external control. Secondly, given the heavy competition between factories 
for farmers-milk suppliers, the factories were sometimes tempted to test milk 
less rigidly, or to measure too favorable for the farmer, in order to pay him 
(temporary) a higher price for lower quality milk than a neighboring factory.
In order to make such 'unfair competition' impossible, a central uniform system 
of quantity and quality control was required, regulating and controlling the 
milk analysis by individual factories.
At an early date, the provincial cooperative dairy associations took it 
upon them to perform this activity. This fitted in well with their other self- 
regulatory activities: control of the books and reduction of competition for 
farmers-suppliers. The associations of the private dairy industry however 
could not perform this task themselves. They did not have the required legiti­
macy, given their looser relation with farmers and the more manifest interest 
conflicts between farmers and the private industry. Hence they established 
from 1920 on 6 independent milk control stations in those parts of the coun­
try, where the private industry was located, in the western part and in 
Friesland.
When nationwide compulsory payment according to quantity and quality 
was introduced, the state wanted to get more control over the quality deter­
mination. Since at the same time the statutory trade associations were esta­
blished, the state thought this to be a good task for the STA. The industry 
however, which originally opposed the establishment of the statutory trade 
assocation, also opposed such a transfer of authority from the existing pri­
vate institutions to a semi-public one. In a pre-emptive move the voluntary 
dairy associations jointly established a new private control system, more 
independent from the voluntary associations. This was however done only for the 
so called qualitative control, where public health interests were most involved. 
The 'quantitative control', on weight, fat- and proteincontent, was to be left 
to the regional dairy associations and the existing independent institutions 
of the private industry. The state consented with this arrangement.
Almost all subfunctions in the present milk control system are therefore 
in private hands. Only the basic regulation, the obligation to pay milk accor­
ding to its quality and quantity, is a semi-public responsibility (The 1958 
'Dairy By-law on Supply of Milk by Dairy Farmers to the Industry'). Further­
more, the statutory trade association passively supervises the implementation, 
in so far as the private supervisory agencies have to be registered and recog­




























































































created by the industry. These provide binding rules regarding milk analysis 
(in a sense the operationalizations of the general rule on payment according to 
quality), such as on sampling procedures, choice of chemicals to be looked 
for, methods of analysis, quality norms for 1st,2nd and 3rd class milk, etc. 
They carry out the analysis, control and supervise, sanction transgressors 
and even handle appeals.
These tasks are carried out by a rather complex set of organizations, the 
result of the long and complicated history of the milk control and the diffe­
rences between the private and the cooperative s-ector as well as between the 
western urbanized consumption m^ilk area and the other primarily cheese and 
butter producing rural areas.
The organization of the 'quantitative control'of the milk is the simpler 
part. It is regulated and supervised by the private regional cooperative 
dairy associations and three independent institutions which do the same for 
the private industry and those cooperative firms for which there is no regio­
nal dairy association any more. Sometimes, these organizations have laboratoria 
of their own, in other cases the analysis is delegated to independent regional 
milk control stations.
The 'qualitative control' is more complicated. Most important are the 
8 Regional Organs for Milkcontrol (ROM's). These set binding regulations con­
cerning quality determination and payment systems for their territory and they 
supervise the milk analysis and pay special attention to the uniformity in 
quality determination. The regional ROM's are supervised in turn by a Central 
Organ for Milkcontrol (COM), which coordinated the activities of the ROM's, 
harmonizes rules by giving binding prescriptions to the ROM's (but this is 
only possible when a majority of ROM's agrees) and controls the control acti­
vities of the ROM's, among other by taking samples everywhere itself and having 
them analyzed and by checking the techniques and instruments of the different 
laboratoria. This actual analysis is done by 6 milk control stations, spread 
out over the country. They investigate cleanliness, smell, presence of bacteria, 
acids, oxidants, residues of anti-biotics and pesticides. Milk is then classi­
fied in three classes, 1st,2nd and 3rd class. For third class milk, farmers 
have to pay a fine, for first class they receive a bonus, paid out of the 
fines and out of regular contributions of the factories to the ROM's, which have 
a central pooling fund for this purpose. For presence of pesticides and anti­
biotics a much higher fine has to be paid. The system is based on control 
afterwards. Preceding control is considered impossible given the bulk supply 
of milk and the necessity of direct processing. Therefore the system must have 
a preventive character. The height of the fines is therefore so calculated, that 




























































































As said, the system as a whole has to be recognized by the statutory 
trade association. This means that it recognizes the COM and through this 
organization - automatically and indirectly - the ROM's, which have to be 
recognized by the COM. Decisions are taken autonomously. ROM-decisions need the 
approval of the COM, but COM-decisions are autonomous, except for decisions to 
change the constitution (need state approval) or to change precribed milk payment 
systems (need approval of the STA).
The organizations are foundations, not associations. This has been a con­
scious choice, because it would give the organization a greater autonomy vis a 
vis the firms. Foundations have no members, hence the firms to be controlled 
have no direct influence on the board. They have only indirect influence. Their 
voluntary interest associations namely appoint the members of the executive 
board. The state is only passively represented on the board. The organizations 
have voluntarily placed themselves under state supervision (again to enhance 
their image of 'objectivity'). This implies that civil servants have access to 
the board meetings of the supervisory COM , but have no voting rights.
The ROM's have a monopoly in their territory, given to them by the COM, 
which has recognized only one ROM for each territory. Affiliation ( not member­
ship !) is compulsory by regulation of the statutory trade association, in an 
indirect way. The STA has issued a by-law, determining that only factories, 
which are affiliated to (and hence controlled by) a recognized milk control 
organization are allowed to process and sell milk and dairy products (Formal 
recognition is hence required in order to ensure compulsory affiliation).
This indirect way has been chosen, because formal compulsory membership of 
private organizations is unconstitutional. Even this 'detour' may be illegal, 
but, contrary to the situation in quality control of final products (Cf.par.6.7.) 
no one has yet challenged the arrangement for the courts. The whole dairy indus­
try consents to this compulsoryness, created voluntarily by itself. At the outset 
however there has been some opposition to compulsory membership by the pre-exis­
ting voluntary control associations. They opposed it because they did not like 
the complement of compulsory membership:compulsory acceptance of every firm 
as affiliate. In the past, some firms had made themselves unpopular by unfair 
competitive practices. Their col.legues did not want to be compelled to accept 
such a competitor as affiliate of the control institution. Therefore, a special 
institution was created, a nationwide Special Organ for Milkcontrol (BOM), which 
would accept firms, not admitted by their regional organ. Hence under the present 
compulsory arrangement firms do not have a choice (whether to join and which or­
ganization to join), but the control organizations do have a choice (whether to 
admit a firm or not). The BOM has for the past years however been a sleeping 
organization, with no members.




























































































of the organization can be based on civil law, which regulates the internal 
affairs of private organizations. Hence they have no need for statutory tax 
authority or statutory sanctions. The financial needs are satisfied by the inter­
nal rules on contributions and Ifines. Payment is sanctioned by the civil code.
And unlike in voluntary associations, affiliates cannot avoid continued
payment by leaving the organization. Appeals procedures are also a private in­
ternal matter. The COM has instituted and regulated a private Council of Appeals 
(Raad van Beroep), where firms can appeal decicions of the ROM's, including deci­
sions to issue sanctions.
Quite separate from this private arrangement there are also state-agencies, 
which could perform the same activities. The Inspection Boards for the Food 
and Drugs Act from the ministry of health (Keuringsdiensten van Waren) can also 
control milk samples and issue warrants to transgressors of minimum quality 
norms and sue them in the state courts. A similar authority has the General 
Inspection Board (AID,Algemene Inspektie Dienst) of the ministry of agriculture. 
They have no supervising authority over the private control system, but exist 
next to it. They could check the private activities by independent controls, 
but they hardly do that any more. The Food and Drug Inspection Boards, which 
in the past used to carry out thousands of controls among milk suppliers now only 
analyse one or two samples a year. They trust the private control. Hence we 
have here a clear example of private offloading of state activity. The state 
control boards can so spend their energy on products of other branches of 
industry.
The arrangement has been a rather stable one up till now. It has been succes- 
ful in offloading the state and has legitimacy, not only towards the state, 
but also towards the industry, as may be apparent from the fact that no firm 
has yet challenged the possibly illegal compulsory affiliation. Some changes 
are however pending. The number of ROM's and of control stations will likely 
be reduced and the state influence will increase, as the milk control system 
will be brought under the new general 'Quality of Agricultural Produce Act' 
(Landbouwkwaliteitswet, 1974). When that happens, the COM will get more hierar­
chic authority over the ROM's (now the COM-decisions need approval by a majority 
of ROM's) and the AID-state control board will get a supervisory authority 
over the private control system. The most important impetus for this change 
is the EC-legislation, which required the Dutch ministry of agriculture to change 
its quality legislation (no quality distinctions may be made any more between 
products for the domestic market and for exports within the EC). A new act was 
accepted in 1974, and for reasons of neatness and simplicity, the state wants to 
bring all control systems under this act. Furthermore, the state also has an 
interest in reduction of complexity. The present complex arrangement is too 




























































































organizations has furthermore become possible because much less samples have 
to be analysed ( a result of the decrease in number of dairy farmers) and with 
the new technology raw milk can be transported over larger distances, without 
loss of quality.
6.5.Compulsory Collective Propaganda and Research.
The dairy industry is equiped with a well resourced organization, making 
general propaganda for the Dutch dairy products (especially the products with 
the highest value added , butter and cheese), the Dutch Dairy Bureau. With its 
budget of 70 million guilders (about 30 million dollars) it tries to purvey and 
maintain the popular picture abroad of the dutch, walking around in wooden 
shoes, wearing funny clothes, and living under windmills and cow udders. Espe­
cially the growth-market Western Germany is its victim: The symbol of the Dairy 
Bureau, a naive natural 'milk girl', in Germany called 'Frau Antje', markets 
the "Echter Kase aus Holland", covering up the fact that the way in which ever 
more milk is squeezed out of the udders of the dutch cow, is not quite so natu­
ral any more. The Bureau is quite succesful. The market share of dutch cheese 
abroad is continually increasing and has passed the 50 % in the neighboring 
countries Germany and Belgium. A smaller cousin of the Dutch Dairy Bureau, the 
Holland Cheese Exporters Association (HCEA) directs similar activities further 
away, to North- and South America. Both organizations - foundations - typify 
a complicated mix of state - and private regulation.
The organizations themselves are private arrangements. The governing 
board of the Dutch Dairy Bureau is made up of 15 representatives of the different 
business associations of the dairy industry, 1 representative of the trade unions 
and 1 representative of the semi-public statutory trade association in the 
dairy industry (Cf.par.6.6.) State influence on the governing board is hence 
only very indirect. It appoints the chairman of the statutory trade association, 
who represents then - one step further away - this association on the board of 
the Dutch Dairy Bureau. Decisions are taken autonomously, the organizations 
themselves do not have statutory powers and neither do they receive state sub­
sidies. They are financed by the industry.
The Dairy Bureau and the HCEA are however the organizations which only 
implement and administer a regulation, made by a different organization, the 
statutory trade association (par.6.6.). The actual regulation is the compul­
sory 'tax' on the industry for collective propaganda purposes, which in 1982 
amounted to f.5,50 per 1000 kg. processed milk. This regulation is an autonomous 
decision by the statutory trade association, which has been allowhd to share 
in the state monopoly on taxation. The statutory trade association collects the 




























































































tax payment. Because of its financial responsibility, the STA has to approve 
the budgets of the two organizations and it controls their financial affairs 
more in general. Hence also the presence of the chairman of the STA on the 
board of the foundations.
This regulation by the STA can be called private. The voluntary business 
assocations and trade unions, which form the governing board of the STA, are 
free to decide whether or not they want collective propaganda or not. If they 
choose for it, they can use the statutory powers, with which the association 
has been vested by the state, to compell every firm in the industry to contri­
bute. Such a decision however requires formally the assent of the minister of 
agriculture.
The statutory nature of the arrangement also implies that sanctioning and 
handling appeals against a decision to issue a levy are in the end state respon­
sibilities. The STA has the power of summary execution ('parate executie’), i.e. 
levies are recoverable by distress-warrant without legal verdict (dwangbevel), 
with assistance of an official writ-server on the basis of the Bill on Civil 
Claims (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering). Appeals are handled by the 
district-courts ('arrondissementsrechtbanken'). Some subfunctions are thus 
carried out privately, others by or with assistance of the state. The STA, as 
a strongly state determined organization, fits in between.
The organizational characteristics of this arrangement are thus rather 
complicated. They have to be scored for three organizations, the statutory trade 
association which formulates and controls the rule (earmarked taxation), the 
state institutions, which handle sanctions and appeals and the private founda­
tions, which implement the arrangement. The organization of the compulsory 
propaganda hence exemplifies a complicated mix of private and public authority.
Recently, by the way, the situation has becaome even more complicated. The 
Dutch Dairy Bureau has over the last couple of years been receiving funds out 
of the so called 'co-responsibility levy'(medeverantwoordelijkheidsheffing),
which farmers have to pay over the milk they produce in excess over their amount 
in the preceding year. This is a state, or rather a supra-state (EC) regulation, 
introduced to combat overproduction of milk. The measure is in the Netherlands 
carried out by the statutory trade association in so called 'co-government'.
The levy itself is a state decision and no longer a private choice as with the 
earmarked tax, but the decision to use part of it to finance the Dairy Bureau 
is an autonomous decision of the statutory trade association and is hence again 
a mixed state-private responsibility.
A similar arrangement has been made for collective research and development 
purposes. The statutory trade association also taxes the industry for this acti­
vity, in the same manner as it is done for collective propaganda. The funds, 




























































































in structure to the Dutch Dairy Bureau, the Netherlands Institute for Dairy 
Research (NIZO).
The organization which formulates the rules, the STA, may be state-initia­
ted. The propaganda arrangement itself however was a private initiative. The 
representatives of the industry on the board decided voluntarily on this arran­
gement, as has been pointed out. What's more, it was a continuation and exten­
sion of an already existing arrangement on a voluntary, rather than a compulsory 
financial basis. Already in 1924, the voluntary association FNZ started a collec­
tive propaganda campaign for natural butter, to counterbalance the agressive 
advertisements of the margerine-industry. This program was extended in later 
years and taken over by the private joint venture, the Crisis Dairy Bureau, 
originally established by several voluntary associations as an exportquota 
cartel during the crisis of the thirties. When this Bureau lost its quota-divi­
sion task in 1936 to the statutory Crisis Dairy Council (Crisis Zuivel Centrale), 
a predecessor by the way of the present statutory trade association, it concen­
trated itself on collective propaganda. After the war, its name was changed in 
Dutch Dairy Bureau, and only in the late fifties did the propaganda get a com­
pulsory basis through the establishment of a financial connection with the statu­
tory trade association. Until that time, collective propaganda was a wholly 
private and voluntary arrangement.
The collective research however shows an opposite line of development.
The present private NIZO, compulsorily funded by the industry, originated in 
1950 out of a state Agricultural Research Station. Here a former state activi­
ty was privatized.
These arrangements hence were a reaction against a felt need to counter­
balance an external threat: the margarine-industry, which was especially well 
developed in the Netherlands (Unilever '.) (Margarine was, around 1910, inciden­
tally called 'Dutch butter' abroad). The emergence was however possible because 
of the bulk nature of the product. Firms fcrthis reason did not develop brands 
and hence did not insist on individual brand-advertising. The close social 
cohesion of especially the cooperative industry which has stimulated many other 
collective arrangements played also here an important role.
The arrangement seems relatively stable. It is not a subject of political 
debate. Nevertheless, the financial basis is gradually becoming more state- 
influenced. Not intentionally, but as a side consequence of changes in the EC- 




























































































6.6.Autonomous Decisions of the Statutory Trade Association.
The most important organization in the dairy industry is probably the 
statutory trade association (STA) for the dairy industry (in DutchrProdukt- 
schap Zuivel or PZ), created under the 1950 Act on Statutory Trade Associations. 
This act has been the example of implementation of explicit corporatist ideology, 
as it was developed in catholic thinking, since + 1848 and embodied in the papal 
encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931). Under this act, 
first of all, the national tripartite formal advisory council of the industry, 
the Social Economic Council, was created. Furthermore, the act made it possible 
to establish tripartite statutory trade associations, regulating an economic 
sector. This could be done on request of the voluntary organizations of the 
industry. Under some conditions however also the state could take the initiative 
to establish such governing bodies. Two types of associations were thought of: 
so called 'bedrijfsschappen', which organize a sector horizontally, i.e. all 
producers in a certain production phase; and so called 'produktschappen', which 
organize a complete product column, i.e. from raw materials producers to the final 
retail trade.
Under the act, 15 vertical 'produktschappen' and 42 horizontal 'bedrijfs- 
schappen' have been created since 1950. Twelve of them have disappeared again 
in the meantime. They are mostly located in agriculture, food processing, crafts 
and trades and a few other industries, such as leather and shoes and mining.For 
the dairy industry, a vertical 'Produktschap Zuivel' (PZ) was created. This took 
however some time - it was established only in 1956 - due to opposition by the 
industry. The voluntary dairy associations originally felt no need for such 
semi-public regulation and went even so far as to create a private alternative, 
the Central Dairy Committee (1953). At first they boycotted the PZ, created
on initiative of the state.The opposition however did not last long.
The opposition seemed a little strange, given the fact that the dairy in­
dustry knew a long history of public and semi-public regulatory organizations.
This began during the first world war, when organizations were required to regu­
late distribution of scarce raw materials and control prices and supply of dairy 
products in the interest of domestic availability. Absence of control would 
have lead to soaring prices and scarcity on the domestic market, as all dairy 
products would be sold abroad to the warfaring nations, which were willing to 
pay high prices. Hence exports were limited by licensing. The agencies implemen­
ting these rules were on and off state or private boards. The original agencies 
were state agencies ('rijksbureaus'), but were in 1916 replaced by 'product 
associations' of the industry. The motive was to avoid in this way "stiff working 
state bureaucracies". One of the first sectors to get such an associations was 




























































































already knew self-governing private associations, in the form of quality control 
stations (Cf.par.6.7.). Furthermore, the minister of agriculture, trade and 
industry of the time knew the dairy industry very well as he had been a former 
secretary of the voluntary dairy association FNZ. Criticism on ineffective 
and biased implementation by the private associations in parliament lead once 
again to a change in 1918. The associations were replaced by state agencies, with 
advisory committees, made up of representatives of the industry. These new orga­
nizations did not only have a task in the interest of the consumers, but also 
of the farmers. For the first time the state provided bonusses on the milk price, 
in order to protect the farmers' income and so indirectly to safeguard the 
self-sufficiency in dairy products. The bonusses were however only given to 
factories ( and so to their farmers) which were a member of the voluntary 
dairy associations. In this way, the state strengthened these associations, by 
providing them with a selective good, in return for their cooperation with 
state policy.
During the twenties, regulation was relaxed , but in 1932 new market orde­
ring legislation was introduced - the Crisis Dairy Act, later the Agricultural 
Crisis Act - to safeguard the supply of cheap dairy products under the condi­
tions of economic crisis. To this end again the farmers' income had to be 
protected. Levies were issued on all fat products and out of the funds thus 
formed, subsidies were given on dairy products to bridge the gap between high 
prices for the farmers and low prices for the consumers. To implement these 
regulationsa Crisis Dairy Board was created, made up by representatives of 
the industry. In 1936 once again the state increased its control. The Crisis 
Dairy Board was replaced by a Crisis Dairy Committee under heavy state influence. 
That was even more increased by the replacement of this committee by a so called 
'Woltersomse organization' for the dairy*industry, the 'Bedrijfsschap Zuivel'. 
These organizations were named after the civil servant, responsible for their 
establishment. Behind him stood however the german occupants. These organiza- 
tions(from 1940) were therefore based on the corporatist ideology of the 
fascist occupants and fitted the description of state corporatism by Schmitter 
completely. The 'Bedrijfsschap Zuivel' had far reaching authority, including 
the authority to close factories and was made up of industrialists, individually 
selected by the state. For the voluntary business associations there was no 
place in this arrangement. After the war> the 'Bedrijfsschap Zuivel' continued 
to exist until the establishment of the new statutory trade associations in 
order to regulate the market under the conditions of postwar scarcity. Its 
authority was however reduced and the influence of the organized industry 
on the board was increased. The staff apparatus however remained the same.
The new statutory trade associations were given three types of binding 




























































































'autonomous rules', initiated and proclaimed by themselves(but requiring formal 
state approval); they could participate in the implementation of state regulations 
in so called 'co-government' ('medebewind'); and they could issue 'general 
administrative decisions' necessary for its functioning, such as the require­
ment by the firms to register with the STA, to pay levies, to provide informa­
tion, etc.
In the years until the formation of the EC-dairy policy, the 'autonomous' 
rule-making activity of the STA was extensive. Generally speaking, the STA formu­
lated and implemented market ordering regulations, more or less equal to the 
ones, later on included in the EC-dairy policy. In fact, EC- dairy policy was 
heavily influenced by the pre-existing STA-regulations in the Netherlands. The 
architect of the EC-dairy policy, the European Commissioner Mansholt came from 
dutch agricultural circles and knew the dutch system of regulations very well.
He had been minister of agriculture before. Many of his civil servants in 
Brussels came also from the dutch STA. Thus the STA-rules controlled in- and 
exports, issued levies and provided premiums to stimulate dairy sales, especially 
abroad. Overproduction could be taken out of the market by the STA at certain 
minimum prices. Influence of the industry in the market regulation was then 
very high. As our informant said: "The representatives of the industry were 
often calculating during the STA board meetings what the different rules pro­
posed would cost or yield their own firms." All this changed when the regulato­
ry action was raised to the supra-national level in 1964. The 'autonomous' 
activity was drastically reduced. Only a few'autonomous'rules remained, such as:
- a rule requiring all farmers to supply all their milk to dairy factories 
(cf.par.6.4.)
- a rule on the payment of milk to farmers according to its quality and fat- arid 
protein content and providing some specifications on the determination of 
quality and quantity (Cf.par.6.4.)
- a rule, establishing a minimum retail price for milk, intended to protect the 
small retail businesses against supermarket competition.
- rules on compulsory levies, not used for the maintenance of the STA-organiza- 
tion, but for special activities such as collective propaganda and research(6.5.)
These rules are formulated and confirmed by the industry. The autonomous 
character is exemplified by the fact that these generally binding rules are not 
published in the'State Gazette'(Staatscourant), but in the Ordinance Papier of 
the Social-Economic Council (which has a supervisory task over the STA's). These 
rules require however formal approval by the state. The formulation of operatio­
nalizations, the supervision of the implementation and control and sometimes 
the actual adminstration and control are done by the STA. In other cases, imple­
mentation and control is done by the other private organizations, as mentioned 




























































































right to disciplinary measures (tuchtrecht) (only some horizontal 'bedrijfs- 
schappen' in other industries have this). The STA can however declare a trans­
gression of certain rules a criminal act. Prosecution, trial and penalty for 
such acts are regulated in the 1969 Act on Economic Delicts. Warrants are issued 
by the Economic Control Board of the state and judgement is given by state 
district-courts.
Appeals to convictions are also an internal state matter. However.appeals 
to STA-rules are semi-publicly handled. Such appeals come for the Council of 
Appeals for Trade and Industry (College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven).
This council is appointed by the state and operates according to rules, given 
by the state (the 1951 Act on Administrative Justice of Trade Associations,
('Wet administratieve rechtspraak bedrijfsorganisatie')). Some members of this 
council are however nominated by the organizations of the industry.
As far as the organizational structure is concerned, the statutory status 
of the 'Produktschap Zuivel' implies of course heavy state influence. The STA 
has been equiped with* a statutory monopoly in its domain,statutory compulsory 
affiliation of all dairy firms, statutory tax authority, statutory authority 
to enact binding legislation within its domain and its decisions are hence 
backed by public law. In return for this, the status and organizational struc­
ture are regulated in law, i.e. the association cannot autonomously change its 
organizational structure; rules and decisions are at least subject to formal 
state approval; and the state is represented on the governing board by a state 
appointed full-time paid chairman and some civil servants who have the status 
of observants without voting right.
In a sense the STA is a part of the state, run by the industry. Its legal 
status is perhaps best compared to a municipality. Whereas the domain of a 
municipal government is a territory, that of the STA is an industry. Both 
function under public law, have the authority to tax their 'inhabitants' and 
to enact autonomous legislation which has the power of law, but within the 
limits set by the central state; in both the central government is represented 
through its appointment of the'chairman' (Dutch city mayors are appointed by 
the central state) but furthermore both are governed by their 'inhabitants'.
These are not'members', but 'subjects' of the authority. A difference however 
is that the city council is elected directly by the subjects (but candidates 
are nominated by political parties), whereas the executive board of the STA 
is made up of representatives, not only nominated but appointed by the diffe­
rent voluntary associations of the dairy farmers, the dairy industry and the 
dairy trade, at least those associations recognized by the state. The affilia­
ted firms are hence only indirectly represented on the board. All firms in the 
domain have to be registered with the STA, have to pay the different levies and 




























































































costs,'dairy values balance' (input of milk, output of different products).
The STA uses such information not only for its co-government activities (par.6.10.), 
but also to construct statistics on the industry. The STA strengthenes the 
voluntary associations in turn in sofar as members of voluntary associations 
are permitted to deduct their contribution to the voluntary association from 
the STA-taxes, with a maximum of 50 % of the required tax. The STA does not 
receive state subsidies, at least for its 'autonomous'activities.
The STA as an organization has been rather stable. Its staff apparatus has 
grown continuously and at present 241 people (1980) are employed by it. Delega­
tion of state authority has in this way created a significant semi-public 
bureaucracy. The 'autonomous' activity however has been rather unstable. It 
has decreased, due to increasing state (=EC) regulation of the dairy market.
The large staff is hence primarily employed for activities, performed in 
co-government. As this activity has a different public status, it will be 
treated separately. (Par.6.10.)
6.7. Quality control of final products.
Quality control regulations exist not only for raw materials (par.6.4.), 
but also for final products. Both control arrangements are however completely 
separated. The organization structure is different and state influence is 
greater in the control of final products.
As in raw milk control, also in product control a distinction has been 
made between 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' control. Contrary to the situation 
in milk control, in product control the 'quantitative' control came first and it 
is still the most important part. Quantitative control, that is control on the 
composition of cheese and butter, such as water and fat content, dates from the 
beginning of this century. Qualitative control, understood as more subjective 
control on the smell, taste,-look and packaging came only in 1938.
Composition was a prime concern of the voluntary dairy associations, because 
falsification of composition threatened the export position of dutch butter and 
cheese. Some interest associations were even formed originally for this problem. 
Merchants and also factories tried to enrich themselves by mixing cheaper marga­
rine or water in the butter and selling it for the price of regular butter. To 
be sure, such falsifications were nothing new. They were as old as dutch cheese 
and butter. Ever since the 16e century the archives abound with complaints over 
adulteration of butter and cheese, and municipal governments have been issuing 
charters prohibiting such adulteration. The city of Delft had such a charter 
already in the 15the century.
The scale of the problem increased however after 1890. First of all, because 




























































































farmers changed over to dairy farming, thus increasing the butter supply.
The industrialization of the butter manufacture with the invention of the 
Alfa-Laval milk centrifuge further increased butter production. Especially 
exports to the industrialized followed grew fast. The development of the marga­
rine-industry, which was especially strong in the Netherlands, created further­
more not only an extra competitor, forcing price reductions through adulteration, 
but also provided a substance with which butter could be mixed. Special machines 
were even created for this kind of falsification, so called butter-blenders. New 
industrial technology made it also more easy to skim the fat of the milk for 
butter production,before such skimmed milk was used for cheese production.Such 
cheese was almost completely made up of water. Hence it became known as "civil 
engineering works" ('waterbouwkundige kunstwerken'). The difference with good 
cheese could not be seen when the cheese was young. But after a couple of weeks 
it plunged together. Competition forced even honest producers and traders to 
follow in the adultaration practices, with the result that the quality of dutch 
butter and cheese became ever worse. Dutch dairy products got a bad name abroad - 
especially compared with the better Danish butter (where much less adulteration 
took place, among others due to the lack of a margarine-industry.).In 1903 
for example a much publicized lawsuit was held in England against a Gouda-cheese 
with only 1,6 % fat and 57 % water. Such publicity did no good to Dutch exports.
In an effort to fill the regulation gap, left by the Dutch state - which 
was between 1853 and 1890 at its zenith as 'nightwatch state' - the voluntary 
associations tried to curb these practices. In an attempt to create some order 
on the market, they instituted a private system of quality control within their 
association. This was a voluntary arrangement. Factories could have their pro­
duce controlled and then stamped with a trade mark, guaranteeing a minimum fat 
content. In order to make this system work, much propaganda was made abroad for 
the trade mark. Not everywhere this voluntary system worked. Many producers were 
afraid to join. Their' customers, the dairy traders, prohibited them to do so.
The traders did not want their autonomy ('t.o mix') to be restricted.
Only when the state intervened, became the system a little more effective. 
The Butter Act of 1889, and especially the later elaborations, were among the 
first new forms of state intervention in the economy, after the short Dutch 
experience with the liberal 'nightwatch'state. These state rules were not yet 
binding rules, that went too far for the liberal tradition of those times.
The state gave a legal definition of butter and issued from 1904 on 'state- 
guaranteed butter marks'. Firms could get such a mark (but were not obliged 
to), when they subjected themselves to certain restrictions and quality norms.
The industry, especially the provincial agricultural societies, responded by 
establishing Butter Control Stations in different parts of the country. These 
private institutions became authorized to issue the state butter marks to firms 




























































































these institutions and were forbidden to "produce, keep, transport or have 
transported any other butter or fat looking like butter, than that which was 
defined as butter in the State Butter Act". Under the voluntary arrangement 
the control stations could select their members, and hence those which could 
receive a state guarantee ( as they had the monopoly on issuing these in their 
territory). Firms producing next to butter also margarine and firms known for 
falsification practices stood no chance of becoming a member.
From 1911 on a similar arrangement emerged for cheese. The enactment of a 
Bill on State Cheese Marks was followed by the establishment of a number of 
Cheese Control Stations. Cheese took a little longer to regulate, because first 
of all, the industry disagreed on the definition of required composition for 
different kinds of cheese. Secondly, there were technical problems of developing 
a trade mark, which would be difficult to remove from the cheese but which 
would neither harm the cheese. In 1930 a similar control system on milkpowder 
followed, after the private dairy association FNZ had in vain tried to develop 
a control system of its own. The purely private arrangement again got stuck on 
the opposition of the dairy merchants.
The control remained voluntary until the first world war. As already men­
tioned, during that war state permission came to be required for export of 
dairy products. Such a license was only given for controlled products. After the 
war the state wanted to continue this de facto compulsory control, to protect 
the export interests. The industry was at first opposed, not so much because 
it did not want compulsory control, but because it did not want to be compelled 
to admit margarine producers or known falsifiers to the control stations. This 
conflict was resolved by the establishment of a state-controlled control station 
where firms, refused by the private control stations could become affiliated, 
that is of course, if they lived up to the requirements. In this was, control 
became de facto compulsory, at least for exported produce. Control for the domes 
tic market was not required, at least by these private control institutions, 
but in practive, also domestic supply came to be voluntarily checked.
Control on the domestic market is regulated by the Food and Drug Act. The 
state agencies, controlling the observation of this act however do not involve 
themselves with butter any more. They only check on cheese and especially con­
sumption milk. This regulation will be dealt with separately, as it is a case 
of a very high degree of state regulation (par.6.11.).
In addition to this control on composition the private dairy associations 
organized subjective, so called 'organoleptic' inspections of dairy products. 
Inspectors classified products in different quality grades, on the basis of 
smell,taste and look. At first these inspections were purely voluntary and had 
the character of a sporting match. When later on the results were made public, 




























































































required such an inspection for an export license and supported the establish­
ment of a private 'quality'control board by the industry.
This system has existed until 1982. Altogether there were 5 Butter Control 
Stations, 4 Cheese Control Stations, 1 Control Station for Milkproducts (milk- 
powder) and 1 'quality'control board for all three products, the ZKB. The first 
two categories coordinated their activities in a Central Committee for the 
Butter Control Stations and a Central Committee for the Cheese Control Stations. 
To complete the organization network: There is in addition an Association The 
Cheese Trade Mark ('Vereniging het Kaasmerk') , producing and issuing trade 
marks on behalf of the state and two Central Councils for Appeal for resp. the 
butter- and the cheese control stations.
Basic legislation was provided by the state in the Act on the Export of 
Agricultural Produce ('Landbouwuitvoerwet') of 1938 and the different product- 
decrees, based on this act. This act also formulated conditions for the private 
implementation agencies, necessary for their formal recognition and authority 
to issue state certificates. This legislation was regularly adapted to new pro­
ducts and new production methods. The industry had the formal right to advice 
on such changes through the just mentioned Central Committees. Operationalization 
of these state rules was done by the different control stations. They issued; 
a) binding inspections rules , such as rules on sampling procedures and methods 
of analysis, permitted chemicals and other additions ,snecial conditions for the 
reception and use of trade marks,prescriptions on conditions for inspection, 
such as bookkeeping procedures, provision of information and access of inspectors 
to the firm premises; b) a disciplinary by-law; and c) of course they issued 
state trade marks and certificates. The organizations furthermore carried out 
the actual analyses and their administration and sanctioned transgressors.
Appeals to disciplinary action were handled by the special Councils for Appeal. 
These had a semi-public character. The council members were all appointed by 
the state, but a minority of its members was^nominaded by the nrivate control 
institutions. They operated independently according to rules, made by themselves, 
but authorized by the minister of agriculture. Costs of the appeals were paid 
for by the state. The state furthermore passively supervised the control stations 
through the State Dairy Inspection Board ('Rijkszuivelinspektie').
The formal state supervision implied that the control stations
were formally recognized. This required state assent for the constitution, the 
disciplinary by-law, rules on rates for control and more generally for the 
financial report. Furthermore, state representatives had to be admitted to the 
board meetings; the appointment and dismissal of the chief of staff, the direc­
tor ̂ required state approval and in one case, the 'quality'control' board ZKB, 
the state appointed the chairman of the board.
The organizations had a near monopoly in their domain. The state had re­




























































































native existed in the state controlled control station, but this was not an 
alternative for a firm, but for the control station, when it wanted to refuse 
a firm. Membership was de facto compulsory. Until 1979, all organizations were 
completely privately financed. Since then, the state subsidizes 50 % of the 
costs (under new product-quality legislation, see further down).
Some organizations were associations with members, others were foundations. 
But where they were associations, the members were not the firms, but the 
voluntary dairy interest associations FNZ ad VVZM, which in the foundations 
formed also the board. Hence the firms to be controlled had nowhere a direct 
influence on the policy of the control stations.
The possible sanctions of the control stations were given to them and 
defined and limited by the state through disciplinary law. Sanctions were: a) 
oral and written reprimands; b) fines of up to hfl.10.000,- per offence; and 
c)intensified control at the expense of the firm. Fines were given very frequently 
The proceeds were high, over millions of guilders and sufficed to pay for the 
organization. This was due to a system of 'calculated offences'. The fines 
were calculated exactly so high, that at a certain level they compensated the 
extra earnings to be had by mixing a little more water in the dairy products.
This level was the level that the control boards wanted to reach in the end. 
Therefore the norms were set a little higher. Both firms and control stations 
used official formula to calculate the fine-level resp. the'offence' to be com­
mitted. As a director said, this was only possible on the basis of private 
disciplinary law. When the control would have been sanctioned by criminal law 
it would be much less effective. Judges would be unlikely to impose the heavy 
fines required for this game, for such 'unimportant offences' as a little more 
water in the cheese - at least given Dutch criminal law norms. Nevertheless, 
it remains a little strange that firms are willing to pay so high a price 
- on average f.11,— guilders per 1.000 kg. cheese - to reach a fat content they 
could in principle also reach without such costs.
The arrangement outlined so far has however been changed very recently 
(1982). This change was caused by the EC. Under EC-policy, it is not allowed 
to have different quality legislation for exports and for the domestic market. 
However, that was just what the 1938 Act on Export of Agricultural Produce was. 
This act was therefore replaced by a new one in 1974, a general act on Quality 
of Agricultural Produce (Landbouwkwaliteitswet). It took another 8 years, 
before decrees for different dairy products under this act were announced.
The state used this opportunity to simplify the organization structure 
of the implementation. It forced the industry into a typical corporatist 
structure as defined by Schmitter:"singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated, recognized or licensed 




























































































on the one, created in 1957 for quality control of raw materials (par.6.4.).
The formerly existing organizations are gradually brought into one organiza­
tion, the COZ, or Central Organ for Dairy Hygiene. Its board is the central 
private authority. Some of the control tasks are carried out by former control 
stations, which now have become a part of this larger organization. In other 
cases, where control stations have been liquidated, subdivisions of the COZ 
carry out this task. The Councils of Appeal are also integrated in the larger 
whole.
The former interorganizational structure is hence transformed into an 
intra-organizational one. Affiliation is made compulsory through a rule of the 
statutory trade association, requiring affiliation in order to be able to market 
dairy products. The COZ has a strict monopoly, because it has become the only 
recognized control institution. Influence of the state is the same as in the 
formerly existing organizations and finance, sanctions and appeals are also 
similarly organized.
An interesting recent development is that compulsory membership has been
challenged by some new affiliates, the cheese traders. Under the new act,
cheese traders are also considered producers, since cheese is sold to them and
vtocowf*irneA
taken to their wharehouses when it is 14 days old. It can however only be soTcT' 
after 28 days. In the meantime, the cheese ripens. This is also now considered 
'production' and hence traders have been forced to join the control organization. 
Unlike the dairy industry they have not consented in this and have challenged 
compulsory membership of private institutions for the EC-court in Luxemburg.
The first verdicts have been in their favor. As a result, the arrangement now 
misses its legal basis for compulsory membership and hence its closedness.
Great anxiety has been the result both in the industry and the relevant 
state agencies. New compromises are sought to fit the law. The state has come 
forward with the suggestion to appoint the private control functionaries as un­
paid detective civil servants, i.e. to vest a private employee with public 
authority. The industry has however opposed this, because such a civil servant 
would have the duty to maintain secrecy, also vis a vis the executive board of 
the private COZ, i.e. his employer. The industry would pay his salary, but would 
not be able to control him. No solution has been found yet. The discussion is 





























































































Whereas the dairy industry is unique in the self-regulation types mentio­
ned under the paragraphs 6.1., 6.4., and 6.5. and whereas it shares the types 
6.6. and 6.7. only with other sectors in agriculture and food processing, the 
self-regulatory arrangement present in the field of social security is an indus­
try-wide one. All economic sectors have private manned sector associations, 
involved in the implementation of social security legislation.
As with the previous type, the formulation and confirmation of the basic 
rules is a complete state responsibility. All 39 social security plans, present 
in the Netherlands, have a legal basis. Many of these are small, i.e. for a 
limited category in the population, such as war victims or the mentally dis­
abled. The 9 larger plans can be devided in two categories: the so-called People's 
Insurance Plans, which cover people independent of (former)employment situation, 
such as old age pension, widows- and child allowances and the health insurance 
plans. They are implemented by regional state controlled 'Councils of Labour' 
or - in the case of the health insurance plan - by private regional associations. 
Secondly, there are the Workmens Compensation Plans, only for wage labourers.
These insurance schemes compensate for loss of income due to inability to work 
because of unemployment, illness and disablement. They are implemented
by privately governed social security sector associations ('Bedrijfsverenigingen')
There are altogether 26 bipartite insurance associations, among them one 
specifically for the dairy industry. Eleven of them, including the dairy indus­
try, have delegated administration to a collectively formed Communal Adminis­
tration Office (GAK). The sector associations are supervised by a tripartite 
Social Insurance Council (modelled on the Social Economic Council, which, 
among other, supervises the statutory trade associations). The organizational 
picture is completed by 10 regional tripartite Councils of Appeal, supervised 
by a Central Council of Appeal, for 100% made up of professional lawyers.
The Social Insurance Council is the official advisory body to the govern­
ment in social security matters. It has the right to be consulted by the 
government on new legislation. Usually however, also the sector insurance 
associations are heard, especially on the technicalities of implementation, 
but sometimes also to inform the state on special sector problems with new 
legislation.
Rule-making as said is the responsibility of the state. There is however 
room for private operationalization of these rules. This is done both by the 
Social Insurance Council and by the sector insurance boards. The latter have 
the authority to issue rules, norms, conditions and prescriptions, necessary 
for implementation and binding for everyone in their domain. Employers are 




























































































to follow guidelines regarding the wage administration. They have to admit 
inspectors on their premises and into their books to allow them to check the 
correctness of the wages paid and the premiums due. In addition, sector insu­
rance associations can determine the height of the premiums, compulsory for 
everyone in their domain, for some insurance plans. They also have the right 
to exempt employers from participation in the general sickness fund, if they 
care to take the risk themselves.
Responsibility for the actual implementation rests with the sector insuran­
ce associations. This includes collection of premiums, administration, distri­
bution and control of benefits, social guidance of benefit-receivers and the 
provision of information on the complicated social security system to the 
general public. The sector associations also control the observation of the 
rules. To this end they take measures to prevent and combat fraud both by 
employers and employees and they develop prevention programs directed e.g. 
at reduction of sickness absenteeism.
In sofar as sanctioning means the withholding of benefits, the sector 
associations are also responsible for the task. Appeals by prospective bene­
fit-recipients to the sector associations are handled by the Councils of Ap­
peal, which have priority over the civil courts.
Sector associations have the right to track down illegal benefit-recipients 
and premium dodgers. To this end they have their own criminal investigation 
department. The controllers employed by them have the right to enter premises 
of employers and workers. The associations also maintain files on all employers 
and employees, containing a record of their 'benefit- and premium history'.
Cashing premiums overdue is done with help of the state. The sector 
associations have the authority to issue a levy against a debtor's property 
at once ('parate executie') and can request bancruptcy (A right, by the way, 
which even the fiscal authorities don't have). The premiums due have further­
more a priority claim.
The organizations are of course legally recognized. Rather: their struc­
ture is exactly prescribed by law. They are endowed with statutory powers: they 
have a monopoly in their domain, all firms are compulsory affiliated and the 
sector associations have 'tax authority' in sofar as they levy premiums, to 
be paid by all subjects in their territory. The state has no direct influence 
on the sector associations but it appoints one-third of the members of the 
Social Insurance Council, including the chairman. The executive of the sector 
associations is made up of representatives of the employers' associations and 
trade unions, recognized by the state. The firms are hence only indirectly 
represented. Similarly, the Councils of Appeal are made up of a representative 





























































































The sector associations as such were a private initiative , although 
not in the dairy industry. Around 1900, some employers established the first 
sector insurance associations to implement privately initiated insurance 
schemes, meant as an alternative to state plans for compulsory accident and 
sickness insurance acts, then pending in parliament. The employers have fought 
these plans vehemently. In fact, this lead to the first nationwide sector- 
unspecific employers association. The Association of Dutch Employers (VNW), 
was formed in 1899 to keep accident insurance out of state hands. Employers 
opted here for a 'second best strategy': under the threat of state regulation 
they initiated private regulation. The state insurance plan nevertheless 
became law, but the private sector associations remained in existence. The 
protestant fraction had, during the parliamentary discussion over the first 
accident insurance scheme in 1901 proposed to make the private sector associa­
tions responsible for the implementation of the act, but they did not succeed 
in gaining a majority for their amendment. Implementation was given to a state 
insurance bank, to be established. However, in 1902, corporatism made its 
first inroad in social security. Then the tripartite Councils of Appeal were 
established, which still exist.
Other insurance plans, such as for invalidity and sickness were discussed 
in parliament for many years, bu their enactment was retarded because of 
conflicts over the organization of implementation. The first sickness insuran­
ce act was for example introduced in parliament in 1913, but it took 17 years 
before such a law was enacted ( in 1930). In the meantime , the number of 
private insurance plans in collective agreements increased. Voices were heard 
to sanction these forms of self-regulation publicly (i.e. declare them gene­
rally binding, just like collective wage agreements) and to delegate formal 
authority of implementation to the existing bipartite sector insurance asso­
ciations. A problem was however that not all employers were a member of a sec­
tor insurance association and compulsory membership of private associations 
was not considered acceptable yet.
In 1930 therefore the implementation of the new sickness insurance act 
was delegated to the sector association, but these did not get a monopoly, nor 
was compulsory membership required. The sector associations administered the 
law only for the employers, who were voluntary members. Unorganized employers 
had to affiliate themselves with state controlled regional councils of labour 
for the insurance of their workers. In addition, there could be more than one 
private association in each sector, i.e. even as sector association they did 
not have a monopoly.
This compromise lead to fierce competition among sector insurance associa­
tions and between these a-nd the state controlled councils of labour. The diffe­




























































































competing with lower premiums. The result was that some associations tried to 
reduce benefits as much as possible in order to be able to manage with lower 
premiums. Low premiums was namely what employers - who decided which associa­
tion to join - attracted, not high benefit-levels for their workers. Competi­
tion seemed so to be at the detriment of the workers. For this reason, the trade 
unions asked for monopoly recognition of sector insurance associations and 
for compulsory membership. Only after prolonged discussions was monopoly and 
compulsory membership introduced: under the 1952 Social Security Organization 
Act, which regulated the status of the present insurance associations. In re­
turn for these statutory privileges, the state increased its influence on the 
implementation organization somewhat.
This form of corporatist self-regulation seems to be rather unstable. State 
influence is increasing, first of all in rule-making, as the state tries to curb 
the growth of social security expenditures. The high growth-rate is completely 
absorbing what is left of economic growth and is hence limiting if not frus­
trating political decisions on budget priorities. In order to check this high 
growth-rate new acts and decrees are issued at such a high pace, that there is 
no longer enough time to hear the supervisory councils and/or the lower implemen­
tation associations beforehand, as was usual until recently.
In addition, the state tries to increase its control over implementation, 
because too lenient benefit-distribution is seen as one cause of the skyrocketing 
expenditures. Furthermore, concern has grown over the complexity of the
implementation structure and the unclear division of responsibilities. Apart 
from sector associations, social security plans are implemented by regional 
councils of labour, private health insurance associations, municipalities 
and their horizontal and hierarchic coordination structures. Benefit-recipients 
have to change schemes and agencies as their carriers as benefit-receivers de­
velop. Often they loose their way in the maze of programs and agencies. It has 
become survival of the fittest. Those who are best informed about the system 
profit the most from it. Therefore, in a recent study by state civil servants, 
both rising costs and complexity have lead to a questioning of the whole cor­
poratist implementation structure. The corporatist Social Economic Council 
has of course opposed these plans, but the state is following its own course. The 
end of this type of corporatist self-regulation could be near, at least formally.
Factually, this is already the case. The implementation agencies have grown 
so large and their tasks have become so complicated - with the development of 
jurisprudence - that the implementation is controlled more and more by the 
many bureaucrats and technocrats, employed by the sector associations. They, 
rather than the representatives of the interest associations, take the decisions. 
As employers' representative van Brussel complained: "In this jungle of ever 




























































































sincere amateur, which the average board member is, can only find his way lead 
by a professional guide. That gives this professional guide a great power."
What is happening here is a well-known phenomenon, only it is not usually 
associated with corporatism: the rise of bureaucracy, but within corporatism.
A paradox indeed: Corporatist structures, in earlier days defended as an alter­
native to state bureaucracy, have turned by their growth into the very alter­




























































































6.9.. The Act on Works Councils.
The Netherlands has since 1950 an Act on Works Councils, which has been 
twice renewed and extended in the meantime, in 1971 and in 1979, after prolonged 
political debate. This act requires firms with more than 100 employees to insti­
tute a works council, made up of elected representatives of the employees.
In 1982 this obligation was extended to firms with between 35 and 100
employees .
The 1950 act also provided for so called Sector Committees ('Bedrijfs- 
commissies'), bipartite institutions, i.e. made up of representatives of 
employers' associations and trade unions, with the task to supervise in their 
domain the implemenation of the works council act and to mediate in and decide 
in conflicts between an individual employer and his works council over rules 
and authority of the council. Since then 71 sector committees for works councils 
have been formed, including one, specifically for the dairy industry.
The formulation and confirmation of the rules is here thus a complete 
state responsibility. The act describes the structure and authority of works 
councils in such great detail - no doubt a consequence of the compromise 
character of especially the recent elaborations - that little room is left for 
sector committees to decide on inter-pretations and operationalizations of the 
law. The act itself specifies a few cases, where sector committees are to 
provide the necessary interpretation, such as what firm unit should be taken 
as the basis for a works council in the case of multi-plant or multi-division 
firms. Furthermore it has to approve of the working rules of each works council, 
after having checked whether , they agree with the law and with jurisprudence.
Secondly, the sector committees are to perform some very basic adminis­
trative activities, such as the registration of all works councils in their t 
domain and the registration of cases, where employers voluntarily endow their 
works councils more authority than required by law ( which does not happen 
of course).
The most important task however is to mediate and provide binding arbi­
tration in cases of conflict between an employer and his works council. Such 
conflicts may concern the temporary exclusion of a council member from council 
activities the use by the works council of certain facilities, the hours/days 
they spend on their councilwork and on training, the opposition of the employer 
to the invitation of certain outside experts, etc. A second category are cases 
where a works council does not provide the necessary approval of the employers' 
personnel policy, where this is required by law. In such cases, the employer can 
appeal to the sector committee to provide the necessary approval in lieu of 
the works council. Mediation by the sector committee is required in cases where 
the employer declines to help initiate a works council, before the state court 




























































































fiict resolution, under the expectation that where this does not succeed at 
the firm level, it might succeed at a higher (sector)level.
Finally, the sector committee has some tasks in the appeals procedure. 
Employers and/or employees can not so much appeal the Law, as well as request 
exemption. The sector committee than has the power to exempt firms from the 
obligation to establish a works council or to allow it to deviate from some 
other legal requirements, such as the number of council members.
Actual control on the observation is no ones authority in particular. 
Generally, trade unions watch whether firms comply with the act. But due to 
the lack of control there are hundreds of firms which are required to have 
a works council, but don't have one. Sanctioning is a state responsibility.
Demands for observation of the law are handled by the special Business Chamber 
of the Amsterdam district court. Appeals - also against decisions of the 
sector committee - are handled by the minister of social affairs.
The principle of sector committees has been a state initiative. They are 
legally recognized and their structure is closely prescribed in law. The esta­
blishment of individual sector committees is however a task of the semi-public 
Social Economic Council on request of the concerned employers' association 
and trade union. The domain of the sector committee has most often followed 
the domain of the smallest partner in the collective negotiations, which is 
usually the employers' association. This has also been the case in the dairy 
industry.
Their legal recognition is a monopoly recognition. There is only one 
sector committee for each sector. They have no members, but all firms, required 
by law to have a works council, are subjects of the committee.
There is no state presence in the committee. The committees are made up 
of representatives of those employers' associations and trade unions, recog­
nized by the state. Decisions are taken autonomously, but financial affairs 
are controlled by the Social Economic Council. The activities of the committees 
are to be paid by both the employers' associations and the trade unions. In 
practice however, it has been decided by the collective wage agreement partners 
that the employers finance the committees;. They usually carry out the secretariats- 
work.
The sector committees were established in 1950, a time when also other 
corporatist organizations such as the statutory trade associations and the 
social security boards were established. The basic motive here was not so much 
a felt need in the industry, as well as the corporatist ideology, then very 
influential in government. The idea was that such task as the supervision of 
works councils could best be delegated to the organizations of the industry 
as they could best judge on the specific sector conditions, to be taken account 




























































































linkage between the organizations of the different classes, conducive to 
the harmonious class relations in the postwar years. The sector committees 
don't seem to have 'suffered' much under the increasing class conflicts since 
the late sixties. They have remained rather aloof from the mainstream in labour 
relations. Their members are usually also less perceptible functionaries of the 
different class organizations, who have continued close cooperation with their 
natural opponent, while their more vocal collegues mobilized the workers against 
the 'enemy'. The aloofness also stems from the relative unimportance of the 
sector committees. Their tasks were very limited and have only recently been 
enlarged. Many sector committees never met, confining themselves to written 
communication.
This scant activity has lead to a discussion, threatening the future 
of the present arrangement. The Social Economic Council, which supervises the 
sector committees, has conducted a study and noticed that due to the lack of 
activity, many smaller sector committees ( such as the one in the dairy indus­
try) got insufficient experience with mediation and hence don't built up exper­
tise. And anyway, the association representatives do not have the necessary 
legal knowledge to guarantee a consistent interpretation of the law in the 
interest of the equality before the law, thus concluded the SER. As usual, 
the contradiction between delegation and equality before the law is solved 
in the Netherlands in favor of the latter. Hence centralization is pending.
Plans are being discussed to abolish the sector committees and replace them 
with a general industry-wide council, assisted by a staff of professional 
lawyers. Interest may give way to expertise, corporatism to technocracy, a 





























































































6.10.Co-Government by the Statutory Trade Association.
After the establishment of the collective EC-dairy policy from 1964 on, 
the STA has become involved in the implementation of this policy in the 
Netherlands. The national government has delegated its responsibility for 
this policy to the STA, but of course supervises the STA-activities in this 
field.
Involvement of the STA in policy formation and confirmation is here of 
course minimal. The STA however has the legal right to be heard 
by the national government, whenever it considers new measures relating to 
the dairy industry. Furthermore, the STA represents the Dutch government in the 
Advisory Committee on Management of Milk and Dairy Products in Brussels and in 
this way it can influence EC-dairy policy. However,it has no authority in this 
field, except for some national operationalizations of EC-dairy policy, such 
as decisions on how to use the co-responsibility fund, under what conditions 
to give advances, etc. Such operationalizations, so called'measures in co­
government' require state approval, just as is the case with the 'autonomous 
decisions' .
The basic activity of the STA under this regime is implementation and 
administration. It is a kind of semi-private tax- and customs office. It 
collects the levies and provides the subsidies, instituted by the EC.
The intention of the EC-dairy policy - as of all agricultural policy - 
has been to safeguard the supply of foodstuffs, among others by guaranteeing 
the dairy farmers an income (This has also been the goal of the former natio­
nal state policy, cf. par.6.6.). The policy is therefore oriented towards 
a so called 'guiding price' ('richtprijs') a farmer should get for his milk. 
This price is annually determined by the EC-authorities. In order to obtain 
this objective, a complicated system of market ordering rules have been 
proclaimed.
The 'guiding price' for milk requires a minimum price for dairy products. 
This is the so called 'intervention price, also annually determined. When 
firms do not succeed themselves in selling dairy products at a higher price, 
they can hand in surplus production at EC-intervention bureaus, located in 
each member-country. For such purposes milk has to be transformed into the 
long keeping products butter and skim milkpowder (which together with water 
form milk). Only for these products is there an intervention price. In order 
to get rid of these intervention stocks a number of subsidies exist, such as 
for schoolmilkprograms, for use of milkpowder in cattle food, for food help 
programs and for incidental actions such as the Christmas-butter actions.
A problem has been the difference in price level between the internal 




























































































higher, to ensure the farmers their income. In order to bridge this price 
difference, two types of measures have been taken in addition:
a- Duties are imposed on cheap competing imports from outside the EC, to bring 
them to the EC-price-level;
b- Export restitutions are given on exports to bring their prices down to
the outside level in order to make EC-products competitive on the interna­
tional market. Firms can get advances for such exportsubsidies.
Finally, in order to combat overcapacity, the EC has since 1977 imposed 
the so called 'co-responsibility levy'('medeverantwoordelijkheidsheffing').
This is a duty on milk, farmers produce in excess over their production of the 
preceding year. These levies are collected through the dairy factories. They 
are used for several subsidy programs, including paradoxically a program to 
increase efficiency by subsidizing mechanization and automation projects 
(which will of course create still more overcapacity).
The STA collects all these levies, pays restitutions, advances and 
subsidies. Whenever these do not balance, the difference is paid by the 
central EC-fund. In addition, the STA controls the milkprice the farms 
receive, in order to check whether the 'guiding price' for milk is reached.
These tasks require a lot of administrative activities, performed by STA-staff 
under the supervision of the semi-private governing board. Because of its 
complexity due to the many rules, frequent changes thereof and many individual 
exceptions,quite a lot of expertise is required.
Since quite large amounts of money are involved - in 1980 about 1 billion 
dollars - the financial supervision of the implementation is very complicated. 
First there is a check by the accountancy department of the STA, secondly by 
the auditors of the ministry of agriculture, than by those of the EC Orienta­
tion- and Guaranteefund, by the EC Calculation Court and by the Dutch Exchequer 
and Auditor Apartment.
Supervision, control, sanctioning and appeals are hence all handled by 
state agencies. The organization of implementation is furthermore also heavily 
state influenced as has already been indicated. The organization structure is 
namely almost the same as that for the'autonomous activity' of the STA. State 
influence is only a little stronger, as the STA receives state subsidies for 
this take-over of state responsibilities.
The arrangement has been succesful as far as debureaucratization of the 
state is concerned. The department of Dairy Farming and Industry of the minis­
try of agriculture is very small, compared to similar departments in other 
EC-countries, where EC-policy is implemented by the national state. The complexi­
ty of the tasks require however an extensive bureaucratic and professional 





























































































Insignificant, but interesting as a somewhat extra-ordinary 
borderline case, is the involvement of the industry in legislation on pollu­
tion control. Legislation, generally implementation, control, sanctioning and 
handling appeals are all state resposibilities, except for one incidental 
element in the implementation: in those parts of the country where still large 
regional voluntary dairy unions exist, such as Friesland and the eastern 
part, the state has authorized these associations to measure the pollution 
emissions of their member-firms, on the basis of which these firms are taxed 
by the state for pollution. They in addition perform this task also for a num­
ber of neighboring firms in other industries.
This is quite extra-ordinary, as such associations, as interest associa­
tions, would have an interest in keeping pollution taxes for their members 
low. They don't have the neutrality,required for such a task. It seems that 
here the common denominator 'expertise' provides a bridge between
state civil servants and functionaries of interest associations. Both seem 
to believe that expertise as common value can dominate interest. And there 
is no indication that they are wrong in this case. The associations are equiped 
with large professional staffs, which could value their professional ethics 
more than their position in an interest association. They can probably do 
so, because of the autonomous position, these regional dairy unions have 
developed vis a vis their members, as has been mentioned in par.6.1. This 
might have convinced the state agencies of their sufficient neutrality to 
delegate this task to the associations. On the other hand, the dairy unions 
don't seem to mind to have to police their members in the interest of the 
state. Other associations surely would. Apart from the relative autonomy, 
this might be explained by the fact that the associations combine control 
of pollution emissions with advice on how to reduce these.
The organizations structure of this form of private assistance in the 
implementation of public policy is whoolly private. Voluntary interest asso­




























































































6.12. Food and Drugs Regulations.
Minimum quality standards for the domestic market are regulated in the 
Food and Drugs Act ( originally 1919). This has been especially relevant for 
the branch of the consumption milk. Milk has been one of the first articles 
which has been regulated by a special decree under this act, owing to its 
easy decay and its importance for public health. In fact, several municipal 
governments had already regulations, dating from before 1919. In Amsterdam 
for example, dilution with dirty canal water (also the city sewers) was 
declared a criminal act in the local police-rules (Not dilution as such, at 
least in Amsterdam. Dilution, with sometimes over 70 % water was allowed, 
but the water had to be clean. Thus milk would be accessible to the poor, 
thought the Amsterdam city-council). Other city governments required minimum 
fat percentages, etc. The city inspection boards for milk by the way were the 
predecessors of the later State Inspection Boards for the Food and Drugs Act. 
These Inspection Boards ('Keuringsdiensten van Waren') control and implement 
at present officially the act for all dairy products. In practice, they restrict 
themselves to the control of consumption milk and cheese, especially in the 
retail trade, where they check how long the cheese remains in the store and 
under what conditions. Butter control is left to the private quality control 
boards, discussed in par.6.7., just as cheese in and shortly after the factory.
This type of regulation is almost completely a state affair. State 
agencies regulate, implement, control, supervise, sanction and handle appeals. 
The private industry comes only in the picture in the phase of advice on 
(changes in) legislation. The ministry of health, responsible for the Food and 
Drugs Act, has a special statutory advisory committee for this act, the 
'Adviescommissie Warenwet'. This committee, in which the food industry, 
including the dairy industry, is represented, has the legal right to be heard 
on all new legislation under the Food and Drugs Act.
As a statutory advisory committee is has been initiated by the state.
Its structure and authority is described in the Food and Drugs Act and as 
such it has a representation monopoly. The industry is indirectly represented, 
through its associations. Even within the advisory committee there is state 
influence. Industry-representatives have to share the committee with a number 
of civil servants, usually appointed as member because of their expertise.




























































































7. Some Comparative Observations.
The different cases, presented in the preceeding paragraphs, show a variety 
of corporatist arrangements. All, except the extremes, show a mix of state and 
private responsibilities in the creation and implementation of binding rules 
and the related administration of justice for a circumscribed category in the 
population, in between case 1 (complete private self-regulation) and case 12 
(almost complete state regulation). In all cases, private industry and their 
interest associations partake in the state monopoly over the legitimate exer­
cise of force, the monopoly over taxation and, as a means, derived from these, 
the monopoly over the creation of rules,binding for all subjects within a 
certain territory.
This function of collective private self-regulation by the industry with 
more or less state assistance, is really the defining element of corporatism. 
Corporatism is therefore not so much a "system of interest representation",as 
in the famous definition of Schmitter (1974). Not the articulation, aggregation 
and representation of interests vis a vis the state is characteristic for cor­
poratism, as well as the opaque mix of public and private resposibility in 
government, which not only includes the formulation of rules (where interest 
representation is directed at), but also the implementation, control, sanctio­
ning and handling of appeals. It seems that Schmitter's definition is still 
to much the result of his confrontation with pluralism - also stressing inte­
rest representation - in the context of which his article was written.
Many of the here presented cases of this corporatism , stressing the 
involvement in public policy, however do fit the structural elements of 
Schmitter's definition:"singular, compulsory,noncompetitive,hierarchically 
ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed 
(if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of 
leaders..." ; From case 6.4. on (quality regulation in milk) the organizations 
involved have a monopoly within their domain and have compulsory membership or 
affiliation. They perform different regulatory activities in different policy 
areas and are hence functionally differentiated. They are singular and hierar­
chically ordered. In case 6.4. the regional organs for milk control are inte­
grated and coordinated by the central organ; the propaganda and research organi­
zations of 6.5. are under the control of the statutory trade association (6.6.
+ 6.10), which in turn is coordinated with others in other sectors through the 
stat-utory national Social Economic Council. This council also coordinates 
and supervises the Sector Committees for Works Councils (6.9.). The Sector 




























































































Social Insurance Council, an equivalent to the Social Economic Council. And 
with the recent reorganizations, also the quality control stations (6.7.) have 
been hierarchically integrated in the Central Organ for Dairy Hygiene (COZ).
From case 6.2. on all are recognized by the state, either indirectly through 
the statutory trade associations, as in case 6.4. and 6.5., or direct. Some 
of them have even been created by the state, such as cases 6.6.,6.9. and 6.10. 
They have been granted their statutory powers by the state, directly or indirect­
ly in return for state influence on the leaders (6.6.,6.10), on the board 
(6.5. ,6.7.,6.8.)or on the selection of those ass-locations which can appoint 
leaders: in all cases 6.4.-6.10 and 6.12. only state recognized voluntary 
associations can appoint board members. In these cases the industry is only 
indirectly represented. They are not members, and hence do not have the rights 
accorded to members of associations by the civil code, such as influence on 
the board and on the policy.
3. Apart from these common elements - which define them as forms of corpo­
ratism - there are significant differences. The different cases represent a 
complete range of variations in between very high private and very high public 
influence. This will be more apparent, when the complexity is somewhat reduced 
by selecting only a limited number of dimensions on which the cases are 
scored, as in table II. In this table, the different arrangements are placed 
on an ordinal scale of increasing state influence.'Zero' stands for no state- 
inf luence. ' 1 ' is state responsibility and '|' and '£' stands for partly state 
influence or responsibility of a semi-state organization.


















1. Frisian Union 0 I o' ~ ’ "*o~ "o'; 0 0 0
2. Cartels 1 1 0 0 ° ! 0 0 13. Co 11.Wage Agreerat 1 1 0 0 0 . 0 1 2
4. Qual.control milk 1 1 1 0 i ; 0 0 2J
5. Propaganda/Kes<arch 1 1 1 0 1 ! 0 0 2!6. STA’autonomous dec.’ 1 Ij__ } 1 1 ! 0 3!
7. Qual.Control Prod. i ( } 0 ' 1 0 0 3
8. Social Security 1 1 1 i 1 i 0 0 319. Works Councils 1 ' 1 ! i 1 0 1 a !
10.STA1Co-Government' 1 1 1 i i 1 }
11.Pollution control 1 ; i ---------- 1




























































































By reducing complexity even further, four basic types of regulation can 
be distinguished. To this end, only the dimensions 'regulation','implementa­
tion' and 'statutory powers' are used. The resulting types are:
1- Pure private self-regulation.
2- State assisted private regulation. Rules made autono­
mously by private organizations or private representa­
tives on semi-public bodies, with the (indirect)backing 
of statutory powers.
3- Private assisted state regulation. State rules,laid
Case 1 - 3 
Case 4 - 6
Case 7 - 1 1
down in law are to a large extend implemented by semi­
public bodies, i.e. representatives of private associa­
tion endowed with statutory powers.
4- State regulation. Case 12
4. One would expect, that , as state influence on the involved specialized
organizations increases, the autonomy of these organizations vis a vis their 
members/subjects also increases. The organizations become namely less dependent 
on their members/subjects for voluntaryly supplied resources and aquiescence 
as the organization is vested with resources and aut-'onomy, supplied by the 
state. Such seems to be indeed the case, judging on a preliminary, as yet 
rather subjective, estimate of the autonomy of the different organizations 
with respect to the firms. That is, except for the important case of the 
Frisian dairy union, which has, notwithstanding its formal dependence on 
member-supplied resources, acquired quite a large autonomy in relation to 
its members, as has been indicated in par.6.1.
Also one would expect that the organizations in the middle range on the 
above ordinal scale, should have the maximum of autonomy vis a vis both envi­
ronments, the state and the industry, as they are in a position to exchange 
resources, acquired from one environment, for those acquired in the other 
environment and in this process of balancing influences from different sides 
develop into an indispensable intermediary. Such a pure input-output model 
however does insufficient justice to reality. Again based on a still subjective 
appreciation, it seems that size of resources is an important intermediary 
variable. The most autonomous organizations seem to be those with the largest 
staffs, such as the Frisian Union (200), the statutory trade association (241), 
the specialized institutions for propaganda and research and the social security 
sector association. These professionalized organizations develop on the basis 
of their expertise and relations a large autonomy towards both environments.
Also the familiar mechanism of internal vested bureaucratic interests, promoting 




























































































5. One wonders whether therfeis a systematic relation between the degree of 
state influence and policy area.At first sight this does not seem to be the 
case. The different policy areas, distinguished in par.4., are spread out 
over the whole range. Social matters are regulated in case 3 , with low state 
involvement, and in case 8 and 9, with high state involvement. Similarly, the 
product market is the subject of regulation in case 2 and in case 10. However, 
if one looks at the policy areas from a different perspective, a certain regu­
larity becomes apparent. All cases of heavy state involvement, i.e. basic regu­
lation by the state (from no. 7 on) are cases where other organized interests 
are involved and/or where the state could be pressured by third parties for 
state intervention. Case 8 and 9 (social security and works councils) are 
matters where trade unions and certain political parties have an interest in; 
quality control, food and drug regulation and pollution control are a concern 
of consumer groups, environmentalists and the health-lobby and are furthermore 
areas where the general public interest is at stake; case 10 finally is a
case of external influence on the national government by the EC-authorities.
The need for regulation at the EC-market level meant an end to the relative 
high degree of self-regulation of the dairy market , which existed prior to 
1964. The heavy state involvement in these policy-areas could hence, paradoxi­
cally , be explained from the pluralist perspective: the presence of other 
competing interests does not allow for self-regulation by the industry, but 
presses for more neutral state intervention.
All cases of predominantly self-regulation furthermore concern in some 
way or another reduction of competition. For cartels, this is obvious; the 
most important autonomous rules of the STA concern a minimum retail price 
for milk and payment of raw materials according to quality, bringing order 
on the raw materials market; the same is done through the binding regulations 
of the Frisian dairy union ( eliminating competition for farmers ) and through 
the 'objective' separately organized determination of milk quality; collective 
propaganda is an alternative for individual product promotion(at the possible 
expense of the market share of the competitor^Enlargement of the total sales 
in addition creates room for growth of all firms and hence thus reduces competition, 
in this way too; finally, collective sector-wide wage agreements bring order 
on the labour market. Hence all these forms of predominantly private regulation 
are a response to the need for reduced competition, larger market- and profit- 
shares, i.e. material advantage of the industry and their farmers.
6. Another distinction between the state dominated and the industry dominated 
types of regulation is that the former concern regulations, not specific for 
the dairy industry. Regulations on pollution, works councils and social securi­




























































































products and the EC-agricultural policy are rules for the whole food processing in­
dustry. Most of the private regulations on the other hand, such as on the relation
betweenfactories and farmers (case 1) , on the quality of raw materials and on propa­
ganda are specific to the dairy industry. General industry regulations could 
not only in the case of the dairy industry be more delegated to the industry, 
sector-specific regulations however could.
Whenever possible to discriminate, the state has done so. More than in 
other sectors have regulations here been delegated to the industry, or has the 
state allowed the industry to regulate itself. This may not only be apparent 
from the fact that before 1964, national agricultural policy in the dairy 
sector was delegated to a semi-state agency, but also from the fact that the 
dairy quality regulations have for a long time been under a separate regime, dis­
qualify regulation in other sectors, where state involvement was greater.
The industry, on its part, has alway preferred self-regulation above 
state intervention, and has been prepared to regulate, control and even police 
itself. This may be apparent from the fact that the industry has never requested 
elevation to public status of cartels or collective wage agreements (by decla­
ring them generally binding). Furthermore, in the discussion over the organi­
zation of quality control of raw materials (in 1956) and of final products 
(1982-83) the industry has kept on emphasizing its preference for private 
regulation.
7. What's more, all regulations except for some concerning the whole economy
(works councils, pollution, food and drugs act) were originally private initia­
tives . They all originate but of the felt need, just mentioned, for reduction 
of competition and larger market and profit shares. Whereas in other sectors, 
firms pursue these interests individually, 'the capitalist way', in a competi­
tive struggle, the dairy industry agreed already at an early stage of its 
development to pursue these interests collectively, thus reducing competition 
through regulation, rather than through forcing competitors out of the market. 
Competition however cannot only be a motive for regulation, but also a barrier.
It creates often prisoners' dillemma problems, undermining collective regulation. 
Such has been the fate of many a cartel. In the dairy industry this problem 
has been overcome, due to the particular structure of the industry.
First of all, the sector has known a high degree of social cohesion. Several 
industrial characteristics contributed to this: the cooperative ownership 
structure, the resulting ties with the world of agriculture and its organiza­
tions, and the extreme territorial dispersion, owing to the need to locate 
the factories near the raw material supply, as milk was difficult to trans­
port, without loss of quality. This territorial dispersion led to the creation 




























































































further enhanced social cohesion.
A second important factor was the early development of well resourced 
and relative autonomous regional associations of factories. This development 
was possible, due to;the very small firm size and again their territorial 
dispersion, which created a need for central staff resources in the region; 
to the lack of knowledge and expertise in business affairs of the owner-farmers 
of the cooperatives; and to the contradiction, which developed between the 
farmer-owners and the directors of their factories.
A third factor was the presence of 'enemies', such as the private dairy 
industry and the established dairy merchants, also enhancing associability.
The bulk character of the product lead finally to a high degree of homo­
geneity of interests.
Sector properties of the past, such as the small firms size, the territo­
rial dispersion and the presence of cooperatives, created so high social cohe­
sion and strong associations, which together made it possible to overcome 
problems, created by competition, and to establish different forms of self­
regulation .
Originally, these self-regulatory measures were taken by the voluntary 
interest associations. Some of them were later on delegated to special organi­
zations, differentiated out of these general voluntary interest associations.
The latter could so remain relatively small and flexible, whereas these 
functionally specialized organizations got a more 'neutral' image.
Self-regulation emerged so out of a need for reduction of competition and 
promotion of sales, and was made possible by the particular sectorstructure.
In addition, these self-regulatory measures were made possible by the absence 
of state intervention and also by the absence of state opposition to self­
regulation. On the contrary, there was state-support for such private regula­
tions. This lenient, if not positive attitude was due to the fact that the 
state had an interest in the industry and has it even more so now. The dairy 
industry is important for public health, but even more so for economic objectives 
of the state: a prosperous agricultural sector, regional industrial policy 
and foreign currency earnings ( given the high export ratio). These interests 
could be articulated and defended within the state by a special powerful 
ministry of agriculture, with strong ties to the agricultural and food proces­
sing community. Thus the state has allowed, if not supported measures taken 
in the interest of the industry, even if they were contrary to other interests, 
such as those of domestic consumers. Given these strong ties between the minis­
try and the associations, the state easily consented in leaving regulations a 
long time a private affair. Self-regulation was stimulated by the state 
anyway, because of the explicit corporatist ideology, influential in govern­




























































































Factors in the structure of the industry as well as in the structure and 
policy of the state have thus been favorable to the emergence of self-regula­
tion. They explain why the dairy industry has shown one of the highest 
amounts of self-regulation of any economic sector.
8. Nevertheless, the influence of the state in private self-regulation has
increased and is still increasing. Only a few of the many earlier pure forms 
of self-regulation have remained, such as the internal rules of the Frisian 
dairy union, regulating competition for raw materials. Others have sooner or 
later been publicly sanctioned (quality control of milk, collective propaganda) 
or have been replaced by state regulations (quality control of final products, 
social security, EC-dairy policy). Not only the rules have become more public.
So have the involved organizations. A first phase was the differentiation from 
functionally specialized organizations out of the general interest associations. 
After that, these orginally voluntary organizations, often without a monopoly 
in their domain, have evolved into de facto compulsory organizations or have 
even been vested with a statutory monopoly, statutory compulsory membership 
or affiliation and sometimes statutory tax authority. Many of the former volun­
tary associations received these statutory powers in the early fifties, when the 
explicit corporatist ideology was very influential in government. In those 
years, the Statutory trade associations, the milk hygiene organs, the collec­
tive propaganda organization, the social security associations and the sector 
committees on works councils were created, all, except for the last one, out 
of pre-existing voluntary or already compulsory organizations. It was the time 
when the Dutch government had a special minister for statutory trade association- 
affairs. In this sense the opposition between the ideological corporatism and 
the neo- or incremental corporatism is less great as is often maintained. The 
introduction of ideological corporatism was in the Netherlands basically a 
formalization and continuation of the .incremental corporatism, evolved in the 
period 1900 - 1950.
There were several factors contributing to this development. First of all, 
it turned out that many regulations were only effective under conditions of 
compulsion and monopoly. Social security was not very well cared for as long 
as there was competition for members between different associations. Quality 
control became only finally effective, when quality control was made a precondi­
tion for export licenses. There was hence a need for tighter regulations and 
this was made possible in part because there was enough consensus in the dairy 
industry over this necessity. Again, close cohesion and strong voluntary asso­
ciations were important conditions for this. Thirdly, there was the initiative 
of the state to increase regulation. The popularity of the corporatist ideology 




























































































state developed during the thirties became in general based on 'compulsory 
market ordering'.So the acts on general binding declaration of cartels and of 
collective wage agreements were created in these years, as well as the compul­
sory agricultural crisis policy. These_ policies were both the result of econo­
mic experiences - self-destructive competition in sectors as printing and 
construction - and of the economic theories then popular, on 'ordering of 
markets'. These theories were influenced by the actual experience, but also by 
corporatist catholic thinking and social democratic ideas on economic planning.
9. Corporatist self-regulation in the dairy industry has generally been succes-
ful. Quality control, market regulation, collective propaganda, reduction of 
competition for raw materials and labour have improved the economic position 
of the dairy industry. The EC-policy has of course been very important, as it 
takes overproduction out of the market, at the expense of the European tax 
payer to be sure. Thus, the state has made it 'easy' for the industry to be 
succesful. But this holds for the dairy industry in all EC-countries. Within 
this market, the Dutch dairy industry has improved its position continuously, 
possibly due to its efficiency, high quality, tight organization and effective 
private market agreements. It could very well be the industry, which submits 
the least to EC-intervention bureaus. It usually succeeds in selling its pro­
ducts at higher prices. But it is of course difficult to determine, whether 
self-regulation has been more effective than state regulation would have been.
Corporatist self-regulation has also been succesful in the sense that it 
has legitimacy, at least vis a vis the industry. Finally, it has unburdened 
the state. Without the private and semi-public agencies, the state bureaucracy 
for the dairy industry would have been much larger. In fact, in neighboring 
countries it is larger.
In stead of a state bureaucracy, however, a rather complicated mixed 
private and public controlled bureaucracy has evolved around the state. Over 1200 
functionaries are employed in this bureaucracy, serving an industry which employs 
only 22.000 workers. The number and status of the different organizations, their 
inter-'organizational relations as well as those with the industry and the state 
have become so complicated, that this bureaucracy is much less accessible and 
clear than a state-bureaucracy would probably be.
10. This has lead to pressure for change, one reason for the relative instabi-
lity of corporatist self-regulation in the dairy industry. Pressure for simpli­
fication of the organization structure by the state has recently lead to a reor­
ganization of the quality control arrangement and to an increase in state 
influence. Similar reorganizations could follow in the industry-wide corpora­




























































































as has been indicated in the respective paragraphs. Separate organization for 
the dairy industry in these policy areas will then cease to exist. Changes in 
the organization of social security are in addition motivated by budget pro­
blems of the state. A similar development in EC-dairy policy could also lead to 
still greater state influence in market ordering and in the statutory trade 
association implementing it. Opaqueness of the organization structure and rising 
costs of government programs such as in social security and dairy policy, could 
hence lead to a continuation of the trend towards more and more state influence 
in the corporatist arrangements.
Finally, there is another factor, this time in the sector structure, which 
threatens the stability of the arrangements. That is the concentration of 
property, which has become very high. Four firms now dominate the industry.
As a result of this, horizontal interorganizational regulations, such as those 
of the regional dairy unions, have been transformed into hierarchic intra-organi- 
zational ones. In the external regulatory system that remains, there are almost 
as many regulatory organizations and associations as there are firms within 
the industry. Already now there are quality control stations, which work basi­
cally for only one large firm. When this trend continues - and there is no 
reason why it should not - the present interorganizational system will become 
untenable. It either could develop altogether into a central staff bureau of the 
future "Dutch Dairy Inc." - but then its neutrality vis a vis the subject to 
be regulated will disappear - or the different organizations could completely 
be reorganized, simplified and integrated within the state-apparatus. That 
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